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Chieftaincy and Decentralization in Cameroon: Unmasking the Opportunities and Challenges in Context

Confidence Chia Ngam* & Kaze Tindo Narcisse Saturnin**

ABSTRACT

The chieftaincy institution in Africa and particularly in Cameroon represents the oldest politico-administrative institution of governance that predates the colonial intrusion. Even with the advent of the colonial rule, this institution incarnated by the chief was used to consolidate colonial influence and governance in Cameroon. The effective politico-administrative organization of chieftaincy coupled with the traditional system governance explains why they were co-opted as collaborators by the colonial administrators. However, at independence chiefs and the chieftaincy institution were relegated by the new political elites. They were not considered in the formulation and application of public policy like decentralization despite their rich pre-colonial and colonial experience. This can partly explain the failure of the decentralization policy in Cameroon as chiefs who are very influential especially at the level of grassroots are not implicated in the implementation of decentralization. Basing our findings on the analysis of existent secondary information in the form of published books, articles, journals, dissertations and on primary sources essentially based critical interviews conducted on the field with varied informants, our investigation reveals that the decentralization policy in Cameroon operational since 2004 cannot be totally effective especially at grassroots level if chiefs who have a strong politico-administrative and legitimate influence are not incorporated as major actors in the implementation of the decentralization in Cameroon. This is because apart from the rich pre-colonial and colonial experience in local governance, chiefs are revered than political authorities at grassroots level.

Keywords: Chieftaincy, Decentralization, Cameroon

INTRODUCTION

This paper examines the potential role of traditional rulers in the effective implementation of the decentralization policy and efficient local development at the grassroots level. Successful local development has been identified as essential to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) outlined at the UN Millennium Summit in 2000, and the World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy

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(PRSP). This implies a stronger focus on decentralization, community empowerment and local governance in development work (G. Lutz and W. Linder, 2004).

Due to the growing interest and support for local development in recent years, many African countries and especially Cameroon have passed legislation to decentralize governmental structures and it has been supported by many international agencies with their own activities. It is fundamental to note that the way in which decentralized structures are organized, actors involve and how decentralization policies are implemented determines the resources available at the local level and the functions of local governments.

It is clear that successful decentralization is not just about building good political institutions, it is not only essential to improve overall governance at the local level and but also to involve any actor capable of boasting development, that is Civil Society Organizations, NGOs and traditional leaders who until now play very limited role in the case of Cameroon. This also includes meaningful participation of the local population and their inclusion into decision making processes to foster transparency, accountability and responsiveness, and to guarantee efficient and effective policy implementation. Meaningful inclusion of all relevant actors at the local level is decisive for successful local development, to ensure that different local power structures work with each other.

The shift in focus from the national to the local level makes a closer look at the social, political and economic dynamics in communities more important in Cameroon. In developing countries in general the state is often weak, and the penetration of the state in rural areas has been poor (Ibid). Decentralization in these cases is not only about shifting power and resources to the local level and making local authorities more effective. It is often the case that the capacity for good local governance also has to be built in areas where governmental activities in general have been very limited. Coupled to this, local government authorities who are supposed to manned and boast decentralization at the grassroots level has not been able to do so. The paradox is even that most of local government authorities do not reside in their area of jurisdiction (councils), rather they live in major towns including the mayors. With their absence and with little or no impact of their authority on the development of grassroots, most people depend on village development associations mostly presided by traditional authorities.

As a matter of fact, a traditional structure has and remains very important in organizing the life of the people at the local level despite modern state structures. Traditional authorities, for example, regulate village life, control access to land, and settle disputes. The existence of traditional authorities means that both the decentralization and the strengthening of local governance are not taking place in a vacuum. Recent experience has shown that successful decentralization has to take existing traditional structures into account. While the standard view has been that they are a historic burden on the road to modernity, it is now widely recognized that for many people, traditional structures are often more legitimate than the modern state.

In many cases, people accept traditional structures because of central government failures in building functioning structures at the local level. To rely on traditional norms and rules is not only comprehensible but also quite rational, especially if there is no better alternative. If the state is unable to improve people’s lives substantially on an everyday basis, it is not surprising that people continue to live according to their traditional structures and rules without taking much notice of the central government.
Most people are not familiar with democratic theory and therefore do not immediately embrace democratic principles and rules. They accept procedures when they make a difference to their lives and help to improve their daily situation. Most people also do not make a distinction between traditional and modern structures. We all simultaneously accept different forms of authority for different things in a flexible way. Authorities can include the elders, parents, religious leaders as well as traditional leaders or elected governmental officials. For some issues we will rely on religious leaders, for others we might rely on the state and accept democratic forms of decision making, and for some other matters we might accept the authority of our parents. Different authorities co-exist everywhere and sometimes they might even compete with each other.

The aim of this study is to analyze existing literature on decentralization and local development and the potential role traditional rulers could play towards effective decentralization policy at grassroots level in Cameroon and also to clarify the basic concepts of their contents and to identify information gaps. The paper is made up of five main sub topics: The first discusses the historical evolution of decentralization in Cameroon. It traces the origins of decentralization in Cameroon from the pre-colonial traditional structures through the colonial and finally the post independent period. It emphasizes that it is because of the failure and weakness of the actors of decentralization policy in Cameroon that chiefs or traditional rulers because of their historical past and attributes could play an important role in effective decentralization at grassroots level. The second part of this paper examines the potentialities of Traditional Rulers as Relevance Actors in Effective implementation of decentralization Policy at Grassroots Level and followed by the challenges they could face. Finally the last part of this paper attempts to present the determinants for an effective implication of traditional leaders towards effective decentralization policy in Cameroon notably at the grassroots level.

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF DECENTRALIZATION IN CAMEROON
The concept of decentralization refers to decentralized, directed from center to periphery, organized around and such. This concept, expressed as the transfer of authority from the center to subordinate ends, is important both for more effective and productive management of the areas outside the center organization in public administration and for strengthening these areas in terms of democracy conception. Because of the increasing interest all over the world in issues such as ensuring service–need compliance, the importance of decisions made by the closest unit to the public and the reduction of bureaucratization have made implementation of decentralized systems a necessity in local regions.

According to A. Ozmen (2014) Decentralization can be defined as the transfer of authority and responsibility for public functions from the central government to subordinate or quasi-independent government organizations or the private sector. In the classical sense, this concept, which refers to the transfer of authority, responsibility and resources from central government to local governments, has a decisive role in central government local government relations. Several definitions have been offered for decentralization. One of the most general defines it as the transfer of responsibilities and authority from higher to lower levels of government. Decentralization seeks to create relationships of accountability among citizens, service providers, and subnational governments and between the local and central governments.

G.T. Falleti (2004) maintains that decentralization is a process, a set of state reforms. It is a series of political reforms aiming for the transfer of responsibilities, resources and authority from higher level to lower levels of state. Decentralization does not include the transfer of authority among non-state
actors. However, decentralization reforms may take place both in authoritarian and democratic environments, as decentralization and democratization do not have the same meaning. Even the political systems described as centralized and authoritarian can rearrange their structures and functions within the framework of decentralization.

Decentralization has political, administrative and financial dimensions. The political dimension includes the transfer of state administration, legislative authority and judicial autonomy to local governments. The administrative dimension refers to the transferring of some classical functions of the state to autonomous public institutions (A. K. Kose, 2004). The fiscal dimension includes intergovernmental fiscal relations in countries where, constitutional and statutory powers of taxation, budget and expenditure rights are given to federal units within the federal state. Decentralization in its current form in Cameroon is based on the Constitution embodied in Law No. 96/06 of 18 January 1996(C. Cheka, 2007) Law No.2004/17 of 22 July 2004 on the General Orientation defines decentralization as, the devolution by the State of special and appropriate resources to regional and local authorities for their economic, social health, education, cultural and sports development.

The history of decentralization in Cameroon from a historical perspective can be examine under three major historical periods; the pre-colonial period and the traditional system of political organization, the colonial period with reference to the various colonial policies with a devolutionary tendency that involved traditional authorities in socio-political administration. Finally, decentralization in the post independent era determined by exogenous and endogenous political forces.

DECENTRALIZATION WAS INHERENT IN PRE-COLONIAL SOCIO-POLITICAL TRADITIONAL SYSTEM

It should be noted that before the advent of colonialism to Africa and Cameroon in particular, the socio-political and administrative organization of the Cameroonians traditional societies was centered on a well-organized chieftaincy institution with the chief at the helm. In most African Traditional societies, political power was organized in such a way that the chief who was at the apex of traditional administration delegated some powers and competences to other institutions that made up the administrative architecture of the village. Using the case of the Bamenda Grassfields of Cameroon, power structure was organized from family lineage head which was the smallest political unit, passing through the quarter head that coordinated quarter activities, the village head managed activities and finally the Fon was at the head of several villages that constituted Fondom. In such architecture, instructions flew from the highest and largest institution which was the fondom to the smallest political unit known as the lineage. In this power structure each institution has its role to play and its specific responsibilities.

THE REAFFIRMATION OF PRE-COLONIAL DECENTRALIZATION IN THE COLONIAL POLICIES IN CAMEROON

The Germans were the first colonial masters to formally annex Cameroon. They arrived on the Cameroon coast in the nineteen century. Upon arrival, they found that the other European countries, notably the British and the French, had already established a noticeable commercial influence along the coast of Cameroon.

Determine not to be left out of this trade area and following what V.J. Ngoh (1989) described as the German coup staged against Britain and France, Germany successfully outwitted the others to
become the first European power to claim colonial control over the coastal area of Cameroon and eventually the whole of the territory. This claim was confirmed following the Berlin West African Conference of 1884. It was therefore against this background that Germany decided to embark on the full exploration of Cameroon and the establishment of its administration. This administration was more or less based on the cooperation of traditional authorities. What should be noted with German colonization was the introduction of municipal administration even though it was not actually named municipal administration (Kaze, 2017). This is because municipal administration presupposes the existence and responsibility of State decentralized structures, in charge of the management of local affairs by local authorities. Initially the Germans were not out to develop Cameroon for development seek, but at the same time to exploit the territory for the interest of its home government.

As the administrative policy put in practice by the Germans was indirect rule even though with a strong gripped on the administrative machinery. According to Engelbert Mveng, decentralization in Africa and Cameroon in particular is not new, because even German settlers in Cameroon were concerned with getting local people to manage their own affairs (Ngoh, 1989). The implication of the indigenous population in the development of their territories was manifested in the administrative organization of German-Cameroon, economic and socio-cultural policy (M. N. Oyono, 2007). It should however be noted once more that traditional rulers were the pillars of German colonial administration.

However, the dream of a German empire in Central Africa notably Cameroon, and the careers of a generation of German speaking Cameroonians was destroyed by the outbreak of the First World War (A. Lee, K. A. Schultz, 2012). Following WWI, the British and the French took over the German colony of Cameroon, portioned it 1916 with each power introducing its own administrative system. The French introduced assimilation in their territory while the British employed the indirect rule system in theirs. This arrangement was confirmed by the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, which gave the allies the ex-German colonies as “mandates” under the loose supervision of the League of Nations. For the next 42 years, “East” (French) and “West” (British) Cameroon would have separate histories and local administrative organization and functioning. The British region of present-day Cameroon (West Cameroon) consisted of what are now the country’s northwest and Southwest regions, while the French region (East Cameroon) covered the country’s remaining eight regions (I. Brownlie, 1979).

Between 1922 and 1945, the British implemented the policy of Indirect Rule thought to be the best rule in British Cameroon. During this period, the British created Native authorities through whom they administered the people of British Cameroons (M. Finken, 1996). The Indirect Rule policy introduced by the British favored the devolution of competence to local authorities. They lorded over local council’s administration. This administrative set up was called Native Authorities and was guided by the Indirect Rule policy.

The British believed that through the chiefs, the local administration will be developed into an efficient organ of modern government (J. C. Anene, G.N. Brown, 1966). The Native Authorities were to be the rudiment or embryo of local government and through this a post-colonial system would eventually emerge. The British also thought that natural feelings would be raised through the NAs and chiefs were to learn from these institutions the technics in the running and management of regional affairs. With this experience, products from these Local authorities’ areas could be able to serve in the executive and legislative. In order to make this dream come true, the British worked
hard to maintain the political divisions or natural boundaries they met and this could only be readjusted to fit the present dispensation. In segmented societies, like was the case in the Southern Cameroons Province, warrant chiefs were appointed to make sure that colonial realities confirm to colonial theory.

As a matter of fact, Native Authorities enjoyed much autonomy in the management of local affairs such as in sectors like education, health, trade, police, municipal prisons, environment, construction and urban planning areas land. Equally, Native Authorities enjoyed financial autonomy (L. Ngongo, 1987). Their financial resources come from taxes, fees for services rendered, income domain, and grants from the federal state of West Cameroon.

Other their part, The French colonial administrative policy, by contrast, was focused on the closer integration of the colonies with the metropole. The mechanism for this was the policy of assimilation, by which Africans who had received western education (évolués) were granted French citizenship and the legal rights of Frenchmen, including participation in elections to urban councils and the French parliament (N. Rubin, 1971).

France governed her portion of Cameroon as part of the French colonial empire although it retained its autonomy as a mandated territory of the League of Nations. The main consideration in France’s colonial policy in Cameroon was to transform the colonized people into French citizens through assimilation. Though the French found it impossible to immediately dispense with the services of the German-era chiefs, they steadily reduced their autonomy and authority, treating them as petty bureaucrats who could be hired and fired at will (V.T. Levine, 1964). Hence, the French administrative system was in practice “quasi-direct” (Ibid).

As such, the method used by the French to facilitate their administration in east Cameroon was the division of the territory into administrative units. This was contained in a decree issued in May 1916 which divided French Cameroon into nine administrative areas. These administrative units included; Kribi-Lolodorf- Campo, Edea-Eseka, Douala-Yabassi, Barie-Foumban-Nkongsamba, Yaoundé, Mora-Maroua, Doume-Loume-Yokadoma and Ebolowa-Akoafim territory(Ibid).

By 1935, French Cameroon had 19 regions divided into subdivisions and administrative positions. The administrative division was made exclusively on the basis of ethnic criteria. The French ministry of colonies was responsible for the administration of French Cameroon. The Governor was the head of the administration in French Cameroon. He controlled all the civil and military activities and was responsible for the policy of defense. For the smooth functioning of the administration, the commissioner was assisted by the Secretary General, a cabinet director, heads of service and administrative council (R. Chot, 1954).

Furthermore, a council of notables was appointed by the commissioner from locally prepared lists of suitable individuals. The role was to represent and promote official policies, play the role of intermediary between the indigenous population and the administration and to advise French administrators on matters affecting the indigenous on matters such as taxation, road building and railway construction as well as legal issues.

Nineteen years after the implementation of Indirect rule in British Cameroon, a similar movement started in the French-speaking Cameroon with the introduction of mixed councils in which the Mayor was appointed and the Municipal Council elected in French Cameroon. No municipality existed yet.
It should however be noted that each administrative division that constituted the major administrative units in French Cameroon later laid the basis for the creation of Councils (L. N. Tsimi, 2015). The first councils, called mixed Councils in French Cameroon were created in the two largest cities of French Cameroon; Douala and Yaoundé, following the decree of 25 June 1941 of the French governor in Cameroon. These two towns were each provided with an executive (head of the region) also called administrator or mayor for the occasion. They were also provided with a municipal commission, consisting of four French notables and two native appointed by the colonial governor. After World War II, an order of 21st August 1952 created mixed rural councils and extended it into all subdivisions of French Cameroon.

Three years later, the French law No. 55-1489 of 18 November 1955 concerning the municipal reorganization of the Black African countries, with the exception of Senegal, introduced the (communes de plein exercice) Councils with Semi-functioning capacity (communes de moyen exercice). In both cases, the condition required by Article 2 of the aforementioned law was "the availability of sufficient level of development to have their own resources necessary to balance with the budget." The fundamental difference between these two entities was that, in Councils with full-functioning capacity the mayor was designated from among the municipal councilors, while in Councils with Semi-functioning capacity, the mayor was appointed by the head of the administrative district from officials of his locality. It is within this communal landscape that French Cameroon became independent on 1st January 1960. The British and French policies laid the grounds for the post-independent decentralization sequence in Cameroon.

POST-INDEPENDENT SEQUENCE OF DECENTRALIZATION IN CAMEROON
At independence one of the first countries with whom Cameroon established cooperation link was Germany. German foreign Policy in Africa from 1960 was largely subordinated to the policy of friendly relations between France and the United States of America. Meanwhile, since 1960, the cooperation between Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Germany have witnessed harmonious development on the politico-diplomatic angle right to the 1990s when it encountered some hitches due to the fact that Cameroon did not respect democratic principles in elections. As such, from a diplomatic stand point, the Federal Republic of Germany was the second European country to have had an accredited ambassador to Cameroon on the 11th of January 1961 (Batenguene Assil) after the independence of Cameroon. One week after, Cameroon established her own embassy on the 18th of January 1961 in Germany. Following the creation of the German ministry for Economic Development and Cooperation, a veritable policy of cooperation was put in place between Cameroon and Germany.

The desire of cooperating between the two States was concretize by degree No 62/DF323 on the ratification of economic and technical cooperation between the two entities. By this accord, the Federal Republic of Germany engaged to provide assistance to Cameroon in her economic development and recently towards good governance and local development. As such, the international decentralized cooperation between Cameroon and Germany is judicially founded by the above mention degree. At independence in 1960, the then Cameroon Republic experienced the first wave of democratic expression defined in terms of multipartism. The same phenomenon was manifested in what was then the Southern Cameroons. With the advent of a Federal constitution in 1961 developed the Federation of Cameroon whose body politic continued to be characterized by democratic experimentation in the shape of multipartism (E. Ngolle Ngolle, 1996). By 1966, the Federation opted for a different form of political process defined in terms of the One-Party form of
politics in line with the desire to accelerate nation building, rapid economic development and national unity.

The year 1966 thus saw the end of the first wave of democratic politics and the beginning of a new and, at the time, most popular form of politics in the Developing World - the Single Mass Party model of politics. For some, the Single Mass Party form of politics was not only in line with African traditions; it was the most desirable to enable the achievement of rapid economic development and national unity. The rationale being that it would harness all the national energies instead of engaging in dispersed and often conflict-prone pluralistic forms of political expression.

From 1966 when the Single Mass Party form of politics came into being until 1982 with the advent of the New Deal administration, the Cameroonian body politic was characterized by and functioned on a centralized monolithic logic whose central hallmarks were: the absence of competing political parties and other freely formed associations, the absence of multiple candidate elections for public office, absence of local population and elites in political life, the limitation of fundamental political and civil liberties, the lack of emphasis on the protection and promotion of human rights, the concentration and centralization of political decision making powers and the omnipresence of the Party over State organs(W. Johnson, 1970). As proposed in the initial declarations of his administration, liberalization and democratization were to be the hallmarks of the New Deal program of government of 1982. To the successor President Ahidjo himself, liberalization involved the restoration of public freedoms, in particular, freedom of thought and speech.

Democratization meant the introduction of pluralism into national politics that took into account the participation of all Cameroonian in the exercise and development of the nation. The first and second waves of democratic politics in Cameroon were different in at least three respects. While the first was fragmentary in terms of the federation, the second was cohesive and national in character. In the first wave, the political parties were regional parties whereas in the second wave, the political parties are to a large extent national party. In the first wave, there were three constitutions at play; in the second wave there is only one single constitution.

In the first wave, the form of the State was a Federation whereas in the second wave, the form of State is a Unitary Republic. What is however common to both waves is the existence of competing freely formed political parties engaging in pluralistic debate and electoral competition with a multiplicity of candidates. This common denominator of the democratic process in the two eras fits well into the democratic concept as defined in democratic theory. The essential quality being that it is a process based on the rule of law, elected representative government, civil rights, majority rule, protection of minorities, separation of powers and popular sovereignty. In such a process, the elected government is responsive to the people and the people possess the liberty to make a choice in terms of the structure and composition of the government in an atmosphere of civility and order. In this context, multipartism denotes the existence and functioning of a multiplicity of political parties all competing for public office on the basis of freedom of choice and within formal rules of law. The post-1982 democratic process proceeded along two wave lengths or speeds. The first wave length or speed involved preparing the then single ruling party for multiparty competition. This phase involved introducing multiple candidacies within the party in elections for local party officials as early as 1983. The phase also involved reorganizing and transforming the CNU into the CPDM as a way of emphasizing the democratic resolve of the New Deal. In this first phase of the process, the minds of militants and party barons were also stimulated to prepare for competition with other
parties. This phase lasted till 1990 when the law on multipartism was passed by the National Assembly opening up the political landscape to a multitude of freely formed political parties and associations all vying for political expression and public office.

In the second phase, multipartism took shape and on occasion, it seemed unmanageable. This phase also marked the proliferation of the private media which violently took on the government and the ruling party in its commentaries. These activities were coupled with sometimes violent social movements all claiming to express their freedom of speech and expression. The most important factor that later change the form of the state of Cameroon was due to internal public demonstrations in Cameroon in the 1990s and in response to some critical developments on the other, the government of Cameroon undertook some political, administrative and economic reforms. One of these reforms was the democratization of political life, through the introduction of political pluralism in 1990. This was followed in 1996 by a constitutional revision which among other amendments made Cameroon a unitary decentralized state.

It is possible to measure the progress of decentralization in concrete terms from 1996 when it became an official policy till date. Its degree of implantation is visible in three areas, namely, legal framework, territorial reorganization and state reforms. Between January 18th, 1996 and January 17th, 2008, the president of the republic signed two important decrees setting up the national decentralization council and the inter-ministerial committee for local services in charge of implementing the decentralization of state organs. The policy was given another face-lift with the signing of three laws on July 22nd 2004 concerning the functioning of councils and regions (V. K. Ngwoh, 2011).

Between July 2009 and December 2010, eight laws were passed and close to forty decrees have been signed by the head of state to enable the process take root. In order to effectively implement the provisions of section 1(2) of Cameroon’s constitution, the structure of the national territory was recognized in order to bring administration closer to those administered. Province and districts were transformed into Regions and subdivisions, respectively, while 59 councils and 12 city councils were created.

The legal framework giving strength to decentralization process since January 1st 2010 has facilitated the transfer of administrative and financial competences from fourteen ministries to decentralized territorial collectivities. These ministries include those concerned with the provisions of water in rural areas, digging, tarring and maintenance of roads, women and the family, agriculture and rural development, social affairs, fisheries and animal husbandry, health as well as education.

Concerning State reforms, the process since January 2010 moved from theory to effective implementation through the disbursement 50.2 billion of FCFA mostly devoted to city and local councils that constitute the heartbeat of the country’s development (Kaze, 2017). In 2010, nine ministries devolved some of their competences and the corresponding appropriate resources amounting to 23 billion FCFA to the 14 city councils and 360 councils within the framework of the first generation of transfer of competence to local councils (Ngwoh, 2011). The finance corresponds to the project each ministry had to carry out in the council areas in the economic, sanitation, health, social, educational, sports and cultural development domains.
In an attempt to effectively execute decentralization process, the government ensured that Cameroon’s city and councils benefited annually from a 6 billion FCFA from the general endowment of decentralization from a total amount of 9 billion. One third of this is used as salaries of council officials while another 3 billion FCFA as investment. The rest is use in the financing the functioning of decentralization process follow-up structures such as the National Decentralization Council, Local Service Inter-ministerial committee and other institutions that go to strengthen the process. Beside the general endowment, government reassigned taxes and duties to councils amounting to about 17.5 billion (Kaze, 2017).

The second generation of effective devolution powers and resources involve five ministries that are going to transfer powers and the accompanying resources to Cameroon’s 14 cities and 360 local councils in the 2011 financial years. These included the ministry of trade, urban development and housing, Youth affairs; Small and Medium Sizes Enterprises.

For more than 23 years now, the post independent republic of Cameroon has experienced a lot of ups and down in the implementation of the policy of decentralization which is one of the constitutional dispositions. As a matter of fact the decentralization process in Cameroon has been more of theoretical and practical characteristic by a multitude of legal texts, institutions and above all, support from international organizations and donor countries. The ineffectiveness can largely be attributed to challenges at the sub-national level such as limited resources, the Profile of local officials, institutional weaknesses and Problems of Accountability and Moral integrity of some local authorities. At the national level, political will of politicians and an ambiguous judicial decentralization law and the unbalance financial contributions.

One of the major objective goals of decentralization is taking administration to the grassroots by engaging the local population to participate in the development of their communities through the election and sanctioning of their representatives through votes. However and most importantly the lack of credible and legitimate actors at the grassroots level in the decentralization process has significantly contributed in retarding/stalling the effective and efficient operationalization of the decentralization policy in Cameroon. It is against this perspective that the role and implication of traditional rulers or chiefs is necessarily significant towards the effective operationalization of the decentralization policy in the grassroots.

CHIEFS AS CREDIBLE AND LEGITIMATE ACTORS FOR EFFECTIVE DECENTRALIZATION IN CAMEROON
The term chieftaincy or traditional authority today is the relics of the multiple socio-political organizations that characterized pre-colonial African states before the advent of colonial rule. Chieftaincy is first and foremost a political unit created out of a multitude of kin groups all centered on a leader (G. M. Eyenga, 2015). Traditional authorities are the leaders of traditional communities. The word “traditional” refers to historic roots of leadership, which legitimizes the execution of power. There are many existing forms of traditional leadership.

“Traditional leadership” is anthropologically defined as including “those political, socio-political and politico-religious structures that are rooted in the pre-colonial period, rather than in the creations of the colonial and post-colonial states. By these key considerations, traditional leaders can include kings, other aristocrats holding offices, heads of extended families, and office holders in decentralized polities, as long as their offices are rooted in pre-colonial states and other political entities (R. Donald, 2003b).
Traditional leaders are the monarchs and aristocracies of Africa who have pre-colonial roots and their African language titles are often translated into English as “chiefs”, “traditional leaders”, “traditional authorities”, “traditional rulers”, “kings” and “natural rulers”. Chieftaincy includes those political, socio-political and politico-religious structures that are rooted in the pre-colonial period rather than in the creation of the colonial and post-colonial states, these offices we would consider to be “neo-traditional”.

**POTENTIALITIES OF TRADITIONAL RULERS AS RELEVANCE ACTORS IN EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF DECENTRALIZATION POLICY AT GRASSROOTS LEVEL**

Within the perspective of governance and development, traditional authorities by their very historical nature possess a number of qualities capable of assisting the modern state to effective implement its policies on the national territory. These qualities vary from the personality and politico-administrative aptitude of traditional leaders and their traditional legitimacy.

**The Charismatic Personality and Politico-administrative Aptitude of the Chiefs**

In most African traditional societies and notably in Cameroon, traditional rulers enjoyed both sacred and secular authority. In the Grass-fields of Cameroon for example, by virtue of the ritual of the coronation ceremony, traditional leaders underwent a remarkable transformation and became virtually invincible and invulnerable people.

In fact, the newly made traditional leader or chief changed in status and was elevated and kept in a respectful distance from the ordinary man. He was at the apex of the visible hierarchy and his ritual of installation made him a sacred person and conferred on him a number of attributes and said to be endowed with divine powers and the incarnate of the political and religious life of their people. Once a prince had been enthroned as chief and undergone all prescribed rites, it was believed that the life force of his ancestors has automatically been transmitted to him. If the transfer of power did not follow the custom and tradition dictated by the ancestors, the usurper, after sitting on the ancestral stool automatically suffered a serious ailment such as sterility, madness or even death (M. T. Aletum, 1980).

As a matter of fact immediately the chief assumed his ritual functions from his people, he automatically became the divine symbol of his people’s health and welfare as it is believed that the life force of his ancestors is automatically transmitted to him (P.N. Nkwi, 1977). All of these characteristics gave the traditional leader a certain authority before his people. This explains why traditional leaders were feared and revered and their orders executed with diligence. Traditional leaders inspired traditional patriotism and the desire of belonging within their subjects. That is why in some instances in Cameroon, the local population respects orders from the traditional authorities than state authorities. In some circumstances, state authorities are oblige to always collaborate with traditional leaders to better exercise their duties, even though it has not always been an easy task.

The office of the traditional rulers in some traditional societies Cameroon and specifically the Grass-fields was a composite one having many duties, responsibilities and obligations. In the Grass-fields traditional society traditional leaders were considered head of the traditional government. They incarnated the function of the chief executive, chief judge, army chief as well as high priest of his community. This was so because in the Grass-fields traditional societies, like in most African traditional societies, the power and authority of the chief were not considered separate or divisible.
They were the guarantors of the traditional order or system in terms of political, security, justice, socio-cultural development of their chiefdoms.

**Legitimacy of Traditional Authorities as an advantage**

Political scientists and sociologists have recently developed very stimulating approaches to understand African states, to explain most of its failures and to indicate the way in which reforms should be led. They have focused their analysis on the articulation between state and society. On this particular issue it becomes common among them to speak of the illegitimacy of African state. This phrase expresses the fact that African state based on predictions is not (ex ante) locally appropriate or rooted (Englebert Pierre, 2000). It is a process of transplantation without no fundamental cultural and traditional basis.

Sindjoun Luc (2002a) justify this assertion by talking, *L'Etat ailleurs. Entre noyau dur et case vide*, an assertion in which he holds that the state was created, ride of its content before been exporting it to Africa. Most African countries at independence notably Cameroon copied their colonial masters administrative system. Luc Sindjoun has described this as an institutional and political imaginary practice in post-colonial African States. By so doing the modern state was created without any legitimacy, but rather state legitimacy was imposed on the people. This of course give rise to what Pierre Englebert, using Kalevi Holsti’s terminology (J. Holsti Kalevi, 1996), has distinguished two sorts of legitimacy: the **vertical legitimacy** and the **horizontal legitimacy**. Vertical legitimacy corresponds to the quality of the relation between society and political institutions or in others words the presence of a consensus on the content of the social contract. The exogenous process of state creation had as consequence that

> the leadership or the ruling class inherited the state rather than shaping it as an instrument of its existing and developing hegemony. As a result, African states were born lacking legitimacy, meaning simply that they were not endogenous to their societies, they were not historically embedded into domestic relations of power and domination, and they therefore suffered from dichotomization between power and statehood”. Vertical legitimacy captures the degree to which contemporary state institutions evolved endogenously to society or were imported and, in the latter case, the extent to which such imported institutions clash with pre-existing relations of authority (Englebert Pierre,2002).

**Horizontal legitimacy refers to the degree of continuity between pre- and postcolonial borders and is measured by the percentage of a country’s populations that belong to ethnic groups not partitioned by borders. Although the arbitrariness of borders is not particular to Africa, the characteristic of African borders is that they were drawn according to colonial interest without any regard to the social and political realities on the ground.**

Even if ethnicity is itself a fluid concept and unreliable source of identity or institutional affiliation, as Englebert (2002) puts it, the fact that an ethnic group exists on both sides of contemporary border, no matter how intense the ethnic identity, means that the border cuts across a pre-existing area of common political culture. Therefore it becomes difficult for an imposing state to get the allegiance of a partitioned group. Contrarily the chieftaincy institution which is the most noticeable features of the socio-cultural heritage of the Africa and Cameroon in particular is very legitimate. This is partly because chiefs have been and continue to be a permanent feature of the Cameroonian society (Kaze,
Throughout history chiefs have been at the centre of the political, socio-economic and cultural life of their respective societies. Although chiefs are referred to by various appellations, the core content and significance of chieftaincy and the functions of chiefs have lots of things in common.

Stressing on the importance of legitimacy vis-a-vis power management Max Weber was famous for emphasizing that power relationships with the subjects are influenced by legitimacy. In political science, legitimacy implies that the subjects accept and recognize that a particular institution has ‘the right to rule’, and that their compliance to this institution is more or less voluntary (M. Weber, 1978). In other words, this means that a legitimate institution has got the right to exercise power it has got power through consent and mutual understanding, instead of through coercion. As Weber explains it; the subjects must have an interest in obeying that particular ruler. Seymour Martin Lipset (1984) provides a slightly different definition of legitimacy; however, his definition is still related to Weber’s understanding of the concept. Lipset argues that legitimacy is “the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society.”

In order to assess the legitimacy of the chieftaincy in Cameroon, the term legitimacy must operationalize. In line with Oomen’s (2005) recommendation, legitimacy within African chieftaincy institution is necessarily operationalized as justified support. Justified as it takes into account the way in which people think of, speak about and justify the way in which the chieftaincy institution obtained its authority”(H.B.Markus,2017) and support it because support forms “a reasonable and measurable indication of whether people will comply when told to do so or not.

In fact because of the reverence citizens have for the chieftaincy institution, chieftaincy is more than ever legitimate. As such, traditional authorities have the capacity based on their legitimacy mobilize local communities for political participation, thereby empowering them to play a part in influencing policy on the distribution of public services. Traditional authorities also have the potential to support the efforts of governments in service delivery by participating in the administration of justice and by mobilizing human and financial resources for expanding educational and health services. African traditional values, thus, not only converge with modern democratic values but also have the potential to complement the mechanisms of modern democracy by filling the gaps in the applicability of modern democratic mechanisms.

**QUESTIONAL INTEGRITY OF CHIEFS AS RELEVANT ACTORS FOR EFFECTIVE GRASSROOT LOCAL GOVERNANCE**

From their historical past traditional leaders enjoyed much legitimacy and influence at the grassroots level and their relevance to the evolution of the modern state has very crucial. Just like Peter Skalnik notes; the consolidation of the state in Africa and democracy necessarily needs the incorporation of traditional institutions that had existed in Africa prior to colonial rule. Chiefs could be very effective in the decentralization process in Cameroon but their involvement is doomed to fail because of a number of reasons.

One of the major challenges capable of jeopardizing chiefs from becoming relevant actors in the effective implementation of the decentralization policy is the questionable moral integrity of some chiefs. Some traditional rulers in Cameroon nowadays continue to witness a drop in respect vis-à-vis their subjects. This is because some of them have failed to play the role for which they were meant
for, but rather, have used the prerogatives given to them by custom and tradition to soil and downgrade themselves. As such, the once respected traditional rulers have become a play toll in the hands of the powers that be. Instances have been noted in Cameroon where chiefs desecrate their thrones, betrayed their people and ridiculed their traditions and customs without any shame all in the name of party politics and the quest for political offices. As a result, it become difficult for such chiefs to serves as the ideal representative for the effective implementation of decentralization policy at the grassroots since they are not in harmony with the people and given that decentralization is about the participation of all local citizens, such a chief is bound to fail in his exercise of authority.

Furthermore, another major challenge is the resistance of central governments to devolve authority and competence to local authorities. Again, knowing the capacity of mobilization and influence of traditional authorities in Cameroon, the central governments and administrations, which are often legitimately weak before the people of diverse ethnic origins in Cameroon, do not want to give up control, power or resources to the lower levels so do not substantially support attempts to decentralize (Olowu 2001). Following Decree No 17/245 of 15th July 1977, traditional rulers in Cameroon were empowered as auxiliaries of the modern government or administration. This was because, until that year (1977), the only legal document concerning chieftaincy in Cameroon especially in British Cameroon was the colonial law No 244 of February 1933. Apart from that there was the need for a new law that would harmonize the chieftaincy policies of the former states of East and West Cameroon. The laws of 15th February 1977 in Cameroon recognized traditional rulers as auxiliaries of the administration. This law equally provided disciplinary sanctions for traditional rulers who did not cooperate with the state. These sanctions vary from deposition of chiefs to the suspension of their remunerations.

In the same Local elites who are not necessarily more responsive to local demands are a major handicap. In almost all chiefdoms in Cameroon, there will always exist a category of elites either in opposition or in harmony with the chief. In fact meanwhile the elites are holding important political functions at the national level, the also make sure they have a strong grip on the base as a support base in case they lost authority at the national level. That is why such elites usually do everything to be so close to the traditional authority to gain favors. As such ambitious traditional authorities will generally get into conflict with its elite. Thus minimizing their chances of becoming efficient relevant grassroots leaders for decentralization policy.

The truth is that decentralization in Cameroon has neither guaranteed more representativeness and accountability nor more democratic government at the local level. Thus failure arises because the local people are not the direct beneficiaries but a means of legitimizing elite power, mostly through patron-client networks. This legitimization is because Cameroon like most developing countries portrays features of neo-liberalism and elite-dominated democratization. No wonder that in most developing countries, patron-client relations between citizens, political organizations, and the state, and a paternalistic and passive political culture that have traditionally predominated have failed to disappear with the advent of decentralization(A. Nickson, 1995).

However, despite these challenges there exist a number of proposed determinants that could guarantee traditional leaders effective implication in the decentralization policy at the grassroots level in Cameroon.
DETERMINANTS FOR AN EFFECTIVE CHIEFTAINCY CONTRIBUTION IN THE DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS IN CAMEROON

Von Trotha (1996) argues that the reliance of the colonial and post-colonial states upon chiefs to act as instruments of intermediary administration between those state forms and local people, demonstrates the 'weakness' of the 'organizational power' of those state forms.

It reflects the lack of integration of state and society in many African countries which is expressed as a series of antagonistic dualities: rulers and ruled, capital city and hinterland, urban centers and peasants. In Cameroon administrative chieftaincy as per the 1977 chieftaincy degree as an intermediary order has become a “double gatekeeper” (chiefdoms and the modern state) between the state and the local people, restricting and guiding access of one to the other in matters of state action, clientelist politics, national and local culture, state and local legal orders, the individual and economic matters.

In Cameroon and elsewhere in Africa, chiefs continue to draw their strengths from their local roots: they defend local culture and social order as well as being at the center of local political life. Yet chiefs continue to be subject to the pressures of the state, especially pressures to encourage local people to conform to the state’s administrative policies, to accept the regime's politics, and to recognize the state as legitimate (Trotha, 1996). Yet despite all of these pressures and various attempts to write off chieftaincy, chieftaincy is likely to be part of the process of democratic renewal of African states (Van Nieuwaal, 1987). Neither chiefs nor the state are going to disappear in the near future, but they do need to be transformed together.

For an effective implication of chiefs in the decentralization policy at the grassroots level in Cameroon, the state has to recognize the de facto legal pluralism and to institutionalize the chiefs' independent legal system, except for such cases as communal violence. In this respect Von Trotha (1996) acknowledges that this local justice may 'perpetuate the injustices' of the local order but believes that local autonomy in this matter is to be preferred.

Chiefs in Cameroon not only have to be guardians of tradition but they must also be active agents of the present and future by promoting the well-being of the community. This is what really validates chieftaincy, not mere calls for 'self-folklorization'. Von Trotha (1996) contends that, while chieftaincy selection is based on ascriptive norms as a means of limiting access to office, and it therefore appears that chieftaincy cannot be reconciled with democratization, this is not really so. Chieftaincy depended in the past on competent leadership. Incompetent leaders could be removed. The kind of competencies that chiefs must have is changing: chiefs have to deal with "the requirements of modern economic, administrative and political challenges and tasks".

Chieftaincy must become 'civil chieftaincy.' When chiefs speak of representing 'their people,' they do not mean that they represent them in the sense that one individual may represent another, but rather they refer to representation as the embodiment of sacred traditions. Yet the political and economic changes associated with colonialism, the post-colonial state (e.g., administrative chieftaincy) and the market economy (capitalism) have undermined this claim to representation by chiefs. Instead chiefs must adopt a new basis for conflict resolution and representation. Von Trotha argues that under civil chieftaincy the chief becomes a forum where issues can be debated and resolved and local interests can be articulated, and a defender of local interests in discussions with the central government.
Any way to a future and promising African polity must give chieftaincy a prominent place in the political institutions and the political process, and integrate chieftaincy in a new system of checks and balances which restrains the abuse of power of the national political actors as well as chiefs and their allies. Peter Skalník (1987) argues that democracy in African states needs to be enhanced by incorporating mechanisms that allow the indigenous political institutions and values to be expressed and to have effect within the imported, i.e., colonially introduced, state. Like Peter Geschiere, he considers the sacred aspect of traditional politics.

CONCLUSION
One of the major development challenges African states faced nowadays are generally linked to the lack of African specificities in policy design and implementation. For instance if some peace processes or conflict resolution have not being sustainable in Africa, it is simply because local specificities were not taken into consideration. Today the structure of state architecture and functioning in Cameroon is fundamentally based on the western model of state organization with very little consideration on local realities in a country with more than 250 ethnic groups, two main cultural identities (English and French) and two main religions (Christianity and Islam) and at the grassroots level, thousands of traditional authorities who in effect one of the most noticeable features of the socio-cultural heritage of the Cameroon. Throughout history chiefs in Cameroon have been at the centre of the political, socio-economic and cultural life of their respective societies. Although chiefs are referred to by various appellations depending on the ethnic group, the core content and significance of chieftaincy and the functions of chiefs have lots of things in common. Based on all these, it is quite clear that the role of chiefs in the effective implementation of decentralization policy notably at grassroots level is very crucial. Above all, the rational valorization of the chieftaincy institution in Cameroon could potentially consolidate state administration and boost development at grassroots level.

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Governance and Leadership Practices and Challenges in Ethiopia: The Case of Dukem Town in Oromia Regional State

Jemal Abagissa*

ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to assess the impact of leadership on governance effectiveness in Dukem town. The population of this study were development team coordinators, representatives of private business organizations, and community institutions of the town. In addition, cabinet members and civil servants of the town administration were the target population for the source of data in this assessment. The findings show that important traits of a leader that results in effective and better performance were missing. The informants argued that poor commitment is noticeable in the implementation of good governance in the town. Leaders are promoted to higher positions without being sufficiently prepared for the leadership role and with less sufficient understanding of the significance of good governance principles. In addition, lack of competence, inefficient and ineffective monitoring and evaluation system were major factors that contributed to ineffectiveness of leadership practices of the town administration.

Keywords: Governance, Leadership, Town Administration, Accountability, Responsiveness, Ethiopia

INTRODUCTION
Managing cities is one of the main challenges of our time. If managed well, cities can act as engines of growth and provide inhabitants with better jobs, housing, infrastructure and socio-economic development opportunities. Conversely, cities that are poorly planned, managed and governed can become centres of poverty, inequality and conflict. Hence, there is a mounting tendency among local and international bodies to improve urban governance. According to the World Urban Forum (2006), the collaboration among local actors for achieving and building viable approach in governing cities is at an important stage of development. In this respect the UNDP’s agendas, such as the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), the Urban Governance Initiative (TUGI) and the UN-Habitat Global Campaign on Urban Governance, have been intended to lead the formulation of strategies and policies in both developed and developing states.

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Based on those global and national initiatives, urban governance can be looked through a set of attributes. One of these is the attribute of accountability which is derived from how cities manage their resources, communicate on the use of funds and achievements to their citizens, and adhere to legal requirements and administrative policies. Embedded in the concept of accountability is the question of responsiveness, which includes the ability of an entity to determine and respond to the needs of its constituents. In doing so, city officials need to have processes of citizen participation, and a system for monitoring and evaluation, as well as reporting on results achieved.

The focus in this paper is on urban governance. No attempt will be made to explore the nuances of the other forms of governance. Here ‘urban governance’ refers to the processes of urban direction-making and implementation that incorporate the roles and responsibilities of the state, the private sector and civil society to ensure effective and efficient service delivery. Competent urban governance is characterized by its efficiency and effectiveness, equitable service provision, transparent and accountable system and participatory and responsive interaction with the public. When it goes in line with this, the existence of efficient urban governance would make a city more competitive and attractive to investors, comfortable for citizens and facilitate the achievement of development goals. (McCarney, 2003). But Ethiopia still lacks these.

While it is accepted that many city governments fail to deliver services efficiently due to resource constraints, this is not the only adequate explanation. There are problems of governance as well. The quality of local political and bureaucratic leadership are important variables for managing a town. Urban governance is considered as a critical yet often neglected area in as so far as development efforts in developing countries are concerned. In Ethiopia, the apparent neglect of urban governance has led to a situation whereby urbanization, estimated at 5.5% per annum, has outstripped the government’s capacity to provide services and strategically guide urban growth. Since the late 1990s, attempts for instituting good governance were put in place but still there is more to be desired. Over the last twenty years, good governance has become a major area of focus by the Ethiopian government. The liberalization of economy and the corresponding structural adjustments in various economic sectors, the civil service reform initiatives and the promotion of the private economic sector are among various attempts that have triggered the demand for good governance in the country (Shimels Fitru (2016).

Similarly, although various initiatives have been pursued in Oromia National Regional State to ensure good governance such as citizen charter, leadership capacity development and fighting rent seeking attitudes and mitigation programs, ineffective leadership and bad governance are still reported in different urban centers of the region. In view of the above points, Dukem town administration of Oromia region is one of the urban centers that faces similar problems of poor governance due to several factors. The objective of this study is to assess the concepts and approaches of governance, assess the impact of leadership in Dukem town and to identify governance challenges.

**THE MEANING OF GOVERNANCE**

The notion of governance began to influence policy debates as it became evident that the liberalizing market reforms from the 1980s would not accelerate economic growth or development. It was then generally presumed that such reforms would reduce, if not end, problems of economic inefficiency, corruption and arbitrary rule in developing countries. In this context, good governance was advanced as an alternative institutional conception of authority that would insulate markets from rent-seeking. Loffler (2009:216) states that the World Bank reinvented the term governance in a
World Bank Report of 1998 to signal a new approach to development that was based on the belief that economic prosperity is not possible without a minimum level of rule of law and democracy. Since then, the concept of good governance is applied to international organizations, national governments and even non-state actors as well.

But as there are many international institutions promoting governance, the content of the concept largely depends on the aims for which it is used. Financial institutions tend to focus more on economic reforms, whereas for the more political organizations the content of the concept finds its angle in human rights law. According to Hufty (2009 quoted in Franklin Obeng-Odoom (2012), now a days governance has become a fashionable term, especially when ‘good’ is used to qualify it. However, the concept has remained difficult to define, with attempts leading to as many definitions as there are many researchers.

In this paper, governance is understood as the process of steering the state and the society towards the realization of the collective goals. As Salomon (2007) stated governance is participatory, inclusive and equitable service delivery. Urban governance is the process that steers and takes into account the various links between stakeholders, local authorities and citizens. It involves bottom-up and top-down strategies to favor active participation of communities concerned, negotiation among actors, transparent decision-making mechanisms, and innovation in strategies of urban management policies.

The notion of urban governance evolved from the work of the GURI (Global Urban Research Institute) starting in the early 1990s. Focusing on the local level, The GURI’s approach was to particularize the concept of governance in an urban context. The GURI developed an urban-governance framework including elements mostly considered to be relevant to urban centres.

In broad terms, urban governance can be defined as the process of decision-making and implementation by government and other stakeholders in a city context with the goal of enhancing urban development. This definition goes beyond urban government to include other stakeholders such as community actors and leaders, the private sector and civil society organizations (CSOs), in partnership with civic authorities.

The United Nations Human Settlements Programme defines urban governance as: …the sum of many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, plan and manage the common affairs of the city. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action can be taken. It includes formal institutions as well as informal arrangements and the social capital of citizens.” (UN HABITAT, 2002a: 14).

FROM URBAN MANAGEMENT TO URBAN GOVERNANCE

One way to explain the concept of governance is to begin by discussing a related concept. In the present context, such a concept is urban management. Management can be regarded as the process of taking care of urban areas. However, in 1986 urban management attained a distinctive meaning following the launch of the Urban Management Programme (UMP) by the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), supported by 14 bilateral donors and foundations (Obeng-Odoom2012).

Kenneth Davey (1993), the author of Elements of Urban Management, one of the early reports on the urban management programme, explains that the programme concerned a citywide approach to improve the contribution of cities to economic growth, social development, and poverty reduction. A
key aim of the programme was to find a way to make urban governments efficient, in response to the World Bank’s (1989) diagnosis of the problems of developing countries. According to the World Bank (1989, xii), ‘A root cause of weak economic performance in the past has been the failure of public institutions.’ To counter the problem, the Bank called for continuing and greater managerialism in terms of ‘having good order and discipline in the management of a country’s resources’ (World Bank 1992, 5). While the World Bank used ‘governance’ vocabulary in some of its publications (e.g. World Bank 1989, 1992), the usage was mainly confined to promoting public-private partnerships and did not favour the idea of civil society and grass-roots involvement in urban management in any meaningful way.

The World Bank’s conception of urban management gained currency in urban studies and policymaking. Five other interconnected reasons have been offered for the ascent of the view. The first was the loss of faith in the Keynesian welfare state, which suffered severe fiscal crisis. The second related to the ascendancy of neoliberal governments that propagated a right-wing ideology of seeking new forms of alliances between the state and other actors, popularly called quangos (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations). The third reason why the World Bank’s conception of urban management became orthodox was the rise in coalitions between local states and other non-state partners at local level, through the initiative of the local state itself or through the prompting of national and transnational forces (Goodwin 2009, 593). Fourth, some scholars (e.g. Haus & Klausen 2011; Nuissl & Heinrichs 2011) have argued that the forces of globalization, including the globalization of the discourse that a big public sector is inefficient, partly drove the need for urban managerialism. In addition to the above-mentioned reasons, it is widely believed that many urban governments’ performance in terms of providing community services was not satisfactory (Newman et al. 2004). From the latter perspective, the turn to the World Bank’s model of governance or the UMP should be seen as a desire to be modern (Bevir, 2011).

Although the World Bank tried to clarify how urban management differed from earlier projects and programme-based urban development concepts, because urban management emphasized citywide strategies for urban economic development (Tibaijuka 2009), the concept received widespread criticism. Three concerns were common. First, urban management was criticized as vague: it was unclear whether urban management meant policymaking, implementation, objectives or procedures, planning, or public administration. Second, the concept was criticized for being narrow and tending to prioritize efficiency over social issues. Third, urban management was seen as nothing new: it was simply old ideas of urban planning at best or, at worst, it was not regarded as a concept at all. Several articles on these criticisms were published in leading urban studies journals, such as Cities (Clarke 1991; Stren 1993; Mattingly 1994; Werna 1995) and Habitat International (e.g. Batley & Devas 1988; Cohen & Leitmann 1994; Jones & Ward 1994; Lee 1994).

Other critical social scientists argued that as a political project, urban management was no different from structural adjustment programmes. Managerialism, it was argued, can be construed as a process of regulation in which politics is separated from professionalism. Accountability to the public is subordinated to emphasis on efficiency and the use of business standards as criteria for ‘success’. As a concept, managerialism has several cultural attributes that emphasize pro-business behaviour (Newman 2004, 18) and institutional changes that give priority to lean public budgets. The critics contended that managerialism brought about a period when contracting out public services became paramount. It changed the face of relationships between state and citizens and between private and public actors, as well as the nexus between providing services, markets, and politics. Accompanying
these changes were the displacement of power from one site to another and the emergence of new modes of power in areas where they did not already exist (Clark & Newman 1997, ix, xiii).

Officially, the Urban Management Programme ended in 1996 (Cohen & Leitmann 1994), and this resulted in a partial loss of interest in the concept. Empirical studies show that the conditions of the urban populations of developing countries were worsening as a consequence of managerialism (Kjaer 2009). The Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN) was particularly outspoken in its criticisms of managerialism. Through its global empirical studies, SAPRIN (2002) revealed that managerialism had weakened the social, economic, and political circumstances of the majority of urban populations in terms of health care, housing, work, food and water, and education, and had worsened poverty levels and created new avenues of inequality.

At the turn of the millennium, the United Nations (UN) started popularizing urban governance and launched the Global Campaign for Good Governance in 2001 (Tibaijuka 2009). The UN’s concept differs from the World Bank’s idea of governance, popularized in Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long-Term Perspective Study (World Bank 1989) and Governance and Development (World Bank, 1992). Whereas the World Bank sought a pro-market state, the UN saw urban governance as inclusive and gave recognition to members of civil society as partners in urban affairs. The UN was trying to create what Innes & Booher (2003) have labelled ‘a collaborative dialogue’ in which partnership beyond the public and private sectors is encouraged as well as pragmatism in improving the conditions of urban dwellers (Goodwin 2009, 593).

Management implies a unilateral approach to administration and planning, whereas governance entails a multilateral, plural, and diverse way of administering cities, drawing on stakeholders at local, national, regional, and international levels (Kearns & Paddison 2000). According to McGill (1998), to ensure that cities contribute to economic development, the ‘acid test of urban management is making sure that the city’s local government is in a fit state, organizationally and financially’.

Why do we talk about ‘urban governance’ these days, much more than we discuss urban management? Raymond Williams describes how the word ‘management’ was extended in the 16th century from its original Italian meaning of ‘to handle and train men’ to ‘a general sense of taking control, taking charge, directing’ (Williams, 1983, p. 190). It is this sense of the term management that has been lost in the urban context. In their institutionalist review of the contemporary urban challenge, Healey et al. state that:

*Urban management cannot be understood these days in terms of ‘top down’ or ‘command and control’ models of governance (Healey et al., 1995).*

Urban governance is an effort to coordinate and integrate public as well as private actions to tackle the major problems the inhabitants of cities are facing and to make more competitive, equitable, and sustainable city. It is a multi-sector and multi actor process concerned about the economic base of the city, participation and equality. Something has changed and city governments are no longer able, or not as able as they thought they were previously, to direct events.

Urban governance transcends the boundaries of governments, making use of a cluster of ideas, ranging from Decentralization to Entrepreneurialism and to Democratization (DED) (Blakeley 2005).
Proponents of governance believed that the changes required would improve urban society, economy, and environment (Kearns & Paddison 2000).

However, Franklin Obeng-Odoom (2012) states that care should be taken not to claim that urban governance is unrelated to urban management. Bevir (2011) has argued that the rise of urban management should be framed as the rise of one of the phases of urban governance, especially because they shared features such as the increasing privatization of hitherto public domains and the fact that both are appendages of a ‘modernist’ view of running cities. Nevertheless, the two concepts have several differences, including the direction of accountability of actors. Whereas managers are mainly accountable to ‘market performance indices’, actors in urban governance are supposed to have greater accountability to the public and community (Newman 2004).

GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE ETHIOPIAN CONTEXT

Although Ethiopia has a long tradition of various governments, it has given little attention to good governance due to the orientation, attitude and work practices of the bureaucratic machinery established to carry out centralized and control oriented government.

After the fall of socialist government in 1991, the political, economic and social changes have taken place in Ethiopia since the establishment of the transitional government and later in the FDRE constitution.

The federal constitution provides the protection of different rights such as the right to hold opinion, thoughts and free expressions, freedom of assembly, public demonstration and the right to petition and right to association. Article 12 of the constitution incorporates transparency, accountability and responsiveness in the affairs of government. As provided under article 12(1), the conduct of affairs of government shall be transparent. Any public official or an elected representative is accountable for failure in official duties. In the case of loss of confidence, the people may recall an elected representative.

The country also established Ombudsman institution. As provided under article 5 of the proclamation issued to establish the Ombudsman, the objective of the institution is to bring about good governance that is of high quality, efficient, transparent and are based on rule of law by way of ensuring that citizens’ rights and benefits provided for by law are respected. For example, access to information to encourage and promote participation, public empowerment to foster a culture of transparency, accountability and promote good governance are emphasized.

The government believes that the corner stone of good governance are quality of service, quick response mechanisms and above all accountable and transparent mechanism. Good governance practices such as participation, rule of law, responsiveness, equity, efficiency, consensus oriented; accountability, transparency and effectiveness determine the quality of governance. A government that enshrines these principles in its decision-making and puts institutional framework in place to implement builds public confidence in its governance.

To this effect, the government has also undertaken various reforms to improve the level of governance. The government designed new policy documents in 2001 to reform the Ethiopian Civil Service in order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the civil service in civil service giving institutions. The overall aim of the Civil Service Reform Program (CSRP) was to alleviate the drawbacks and wrong practices of the previous military regime and to build an efficient and effective civil service system. The civil service reform program (CSRP) has five components/sub-programs to improve: (1) Top management systems; (2) Governance of financial resources and control; (3) Ethics (4) Governance of human resources and control; and (5) Public service delivery.
The Service Delivery Sub-program elaborates problems and drawbacks of the Ethiopian Civil Service in the delivery of services, the need for and objectives of the policy as well as policy instruments and strategies designed to attain these objectives.

In order to strengthen service delivery and to realize quality of governance in the urban centers, urban good governance package was also designed in Ethiopian Urban Development Policy of 2006 (MUWD, 2006). Ensuring good governance practices in urban leadership and administration is emphasized. In its five-year Growth and Transformation Plan, 2010/11-2014/15 urban centers are frequently cited as “growth and development poles” that require effective leadership practices to accommodate these functions. Therefore, the issue of leadership practices and good governance implementation has become a center of attention to promote poverty reduction programs that enhance economic development (MoFED, 2009).

In Ethiopia, the urban sector encompasses several sub-sectors and constitutes a complex development issues. In addition to the provision of services, it includes cross-cutting areas such as employment and poverty alleviation, gender and environment. The complexity of the sector and the relative weakness of existing institutions points to the need for increased emphasis on governance and leadership capacity.

**LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE**

The significance of leadership to governance is paramount. Leaders play an important role in governance (DfES, 2006). They provide ‘direction’ for governance by fostering a ‘shared understanding and clarity around roles. Nnablife (2010) states that the survival of a system rests with leadership. All things rise and fall on leadership because leadership effectiveness is a steering that drives organization to heights of development and productivity by the application of good governance.

According to Sindane (2011), the two are closely linked, that is, effective leadership includes an adaptive response to the non-routine as well as strategic challenges faced by society and government institutions whereas good governance has to do with accountability and transparency. As noted by Soludo (2007), while governance is the traditions and institutions by which authority is exercised, leadership is the act of exercising that authority. The nexus of leadership and good governance is the reason for the assertion by Othman and Rahman (2014) that governance is about effective leadership. According to them, the connection of leadership with governance is seen in efficiency, probity, responsibility, transparency and accountability. Supporting the nexus of leadership and good governance, Soludo (2007) argues that governance and leadership are so intricately related that one circumscribes the other.

**WHAT IS LEADERSHIP?**

Hah and Bartol (1983) define political leadership as the mobilization and direction, by a person or persons using essentially non-coercive means, of other persons within a society to act in patterned and coherent ways that cause (or prevent) change in the authoritative allocation of values within that society. Effective leadership requires its own essential quality. For instance, competence (both professional and leadership) is among the essential qualities of effective leadership. A leader without having competence may not be effective and efficient in leading an organization. When seen in light of good governance, efficiency and effectiveness in giving services to the public, utilization of resources both human and material is among the key principle of good governance. If a leader lacks
competence about what he has doing he may not be effective and efficient in discharging his responsibility, which results in misuse of public resources.

The other point to be discussed in leadership is accountability that envisages making accountable the leader for his action or omission. The same principle is applied in ensuring Good Governance. Taking government as one of the actors in governance, accountability ensures actions and decisions taken by public officials are subject to oversight so as to guarantee that government initiatives meet their stated objectives and respond to the needs of the community they are meant to be benefiting, thereby contributing to better governance.

The other important quality of effective leadership is openness. In exercising leadership, openness fosters integrity and dedication of the leader to achieve the targeted goal. By dedication, it is to mean that the leader spends his time to accomplish the targeted objective being a model for others. Through openness, there is free flow of information among leaders and followers, including the public at large. Because, the leaders are there to serve the public at large. Relating it to Good Governance, the public has a right to access information and to have a say about what the leaders do on behalf of the public at large.

Participation can be possible if the leader is open. When we say participation, it is by both men and women as it is a key cornerstone of good governance. Participation needs to be informed and organized. This means freedom of association and expression on the one hand and an organized civil society on the other hand. This can be fruitful if and only if the leader is ready to be open to share new ideas. Otherwise, if the public is denied the right to access of information it results in loss of public trust; and this in turn results in public grievance.

Moreover, because the leaders are there to serve the common interests of group of people, to achieve effectively the objective they set, they have to reach at consensus by allowing the participation of those interested group of concerned people. Because, consensus orientation is a corner stone for Good Governance by mediating different interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interest of the group.

Openness can be also manifested through transparent working systems and procedures. That is to say decisions taken and their enforcement are done in a manner that follows rules and regulations. It also means that information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by such decisions and their enforcement. It also means that enough information is provided and that it is provided in easily understandable forms and media. The same principle is applied in ensuring Good Governance.

Equity and inclusiveness is one of the important principles in ensuring Good Governance. In the absence of a leadership that encourages openness, participation, transparency we may not envisage equity and inclusiveness. A society’s wellbeing depends on ensuring that all its members feel that they have a stake in it and do not feel excluded from the mainstream of society. This requires all groups, but particularly the most vulnerable, have opportunities to improve or maintain their wellbeing. This can be achieved only if the leader gives such opportunity; otherwise, the society, particularly, those vulnerable have no chance to reflect their interest.
Generally, effective leadership and Good Governance are two sides of the same coin. The two have many elements in common. Without an effective leadership, we may not envisage Good Governance in its totality.

In order to realize quality of governance in the urban centers, urban good governance package was formulated in Ethiopian Urban Development Policy of 2006 (MUWD, 2006). Furthermore, as the country entered its new millennium, efforts continued in improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector leadership, and ensuring the rule of law has been given utmost attention for the greater good. Ensuring good governance practices in urban leadership and administration is one of the priorities of the Ethiopian government. In its five-year Growth and Transformation Plan, 2010/11-2014/15 urban centers are frequently cited as “growth and development poles” that require effective leadership practices to accommodate these functions. Therefore, the issue of leadership practices and good governance implementation has become a center of attention to promote poverty reduction programs that enhance economic development (MoFED, 2009).

DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA

Dukem town is located at 37km South East of Addis Ababa along the main road to Adama. It is among rapidly developing towns of Oromia region state towns. According to the 2007 census, the total population of the town was 24,024. The population is rapidly growing because of its proximity to Addis Ababa and its economic importance because of job opportunities created by investment expansions. The town has four administrative units named kebeles (the lowest unit of urban administration in Ethiopia).

The federal constitution provides for a four-tier framework consisting of regions (states), zones (cluster of districts), woredas (districts) and kebeles (neighborhoods). Regional governments have been reviewing municipal roles and introducing new legislation on the functions of municipalities in their jurisdictions. Municipalities have the powers including but not limited to the preparation of budget proposals, assessment and collection of municipal revenues, preparation and implementation of development plans, construction of internal roads, and provision of a range of public services.

According to the Oromia Region Proclamation No. 65/2003, Article 6 (1), towns and cities in Region are categorized into four levels based on their population number. Cities with more than 90,000 inhabitants are categorized as first level. Cities and towns with between 45,000 and 89,000, 10,000 and 44,999 and 2,000 and 9,999 residents are categorized as 2nd, 3rd and 4th level respectively. Based on this classification, Dukem town falls within the 3rd category.

THE RESEARCH APPROACH

The study investigates the role of leadership in ensuring good governance and the challenges faced the leaders in Dukem town administration. A descriptive research design, involving the method of cross-sectional research was chosen and used to conduct the study on the leadership and governance of Dukem town, Oromia region. The research relies on both qualitative and quantitative types of data. To this effect, the primary data sources were collected from various respondents and local administration through questionnaires and interviews whereas secondary data were extracted from reports, CSA documents and regional government archives.
Most of the collected data were quantified for simplicity, others such as open ended, and interview were qualitatively analyzed. A descriptive analysis method was used in the process of transcribing the raw data in to a form that would make them easy to understand the subject.

**Population**

The population of this study were team coordinators and representatives of private business organizations, and community institutions of the town. In addition, government organization cabinet members and civil servants of the town administration were the target population for the source of data in this assessment.

**Sampling and Sample size**

Both probability and non-probability sampling technique have been employed to collect the necessary data. First, non-random sampling technique was employed in the study area. The target population was a total of 145 sample respondents that have been selected from the residents and the city administration of which 123 responded to the questions addressed.

**Method of Data Analysis**

The responses were organized and framed to suit for the analysis. The quantitative data were analyzed using descriptive statistics such as frequencies and percentages. The analysis and interpretation of the data is presented using tables, figures, and graphs. Qualitative data obtained through semi-structured interview from key informants were transcribed and presented.

**Governance and leadership in Dukem Town**

Even though good governance is a result of complex interactions between different bodies, it is mainly based on practices and roles of leadership. Hence, the results of practices and processes of leadership in ensuring good governance is analyzed in terms of good governance principles such as participation, consensus building, transparency, accountability, timeliness, rule of law and effectiveness in achieving predetermined objectives. These governance attributes enable practitioners, leaders and residents to better compare heterogeneous urban contexts and work together to bring diverse resources, experiences and skills to bear on the improvement of life in the cities.

To promote public participation the leader’s commitment is important that ensures the engagement of all stakeholders in planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of urban development activities. Harnessing the constituent potential and directing to create common goals in which everyone believes is important activity in the leadership practices. Creating an environment that permits community to fully slot in and participate in the process shows high leadership commitment.

Figure 1 depicts that 76% of respondents agreed that the leadership is poorly commitment to initiate community participation in the development processes. Evidence suggests that the principal ingredient for success is visionary and strategic leadership. The success of participatory governance is dependent on a form of leadership that operates on the basis of sharing power and advancing the collective interest of the city. A cursory glance at the management challenges explored before suggests that the future of cities will increasingly depend on the quality of strategic leadership and management.
Factors Affecting Participation in Town’s Affairs

Factors that hinder public participation in planning, decision-making and implementations were manifold. In this regard respondents were asked to choose from alternatives and reply by ranking the major factors in relation to their effects on participation of community.

Figure 2 depicts that 95% of respondents rated poor relationship between leaders and community as major factor that impede community participation in Town affairs. Among individuals who participated in the study 85% of them argued that lack of effective guidance from the leadership is another factor that setback community participation. Lack of timely information in necessary issues was rated as another factor by 83% of respondents.

Participatory governance and consensus orientation is a corner stone for good governance by mediating different interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interest of the group.
As it can be seen from figure 3, 91% of respondents replied that the community do not trust the leadership. Only 9% of the respondents argued that community and the leadership have common understanding and good relationship. The same question has been addressed to the interviewees to explain the state of the relationship between leadership and community. They forwarded that though the progress and improvements have been observed in this regard there is still lack of consensus between the leadership and the community.

As in the interviews conducted with key officials the main reason behind the town’s low achievement in participation was the way that institutions mostly favored participation to be conducted through suggestion boxes put in the compound of most institutions rather than face to face discussions with customers or their representatives.

**Ensuring Transparent Service Delivery**

Transparency mainly focused on the accessibility and the level of information disclosure to the public in decision-making and in the provision of goods and services. Hence, in this study it has been assessed based on some mechanisms that the leadership practiced to disclose and make accessible the necessary information.

**Table 1: Information dissemination Mechanisms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Public Meetings</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Development group discussions</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Public forums</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Media coverage</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>123</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Disclosing procedures, clear and easily understandable; and informing staff members when important decisions are made are some of the indicators of transparency. Accessing information, being transparent for the service users and having clear procedures to complain and suggest were
considered as part of the study. The above table shows that the town administration employed different mechanisms to disseminate information. Accordingly, 67% of the respondents pointed out that public meetings are the common mechanism that the town administration used to disclose information. Others 20% of the respondents replied that public fora are another mechanisms that were used to disclose information.

Similarly, the interviewed individuals stated that the common mechanisms that the leadership employed to share information, decisions and other messages were public forum and meetings that were quarterly scheduled. On the other hand, the problem is that few members of the community participate in meetings. Therefore it is challenging to reach all the community with timely information.

OPENNESS AND CLARITY IN SERVICE PROVISION

Openness is built upon free flow of information, its availability, direct accessibility and clarity in an understandable way for all stakeholders. Regarding openness in service provision, two questions were forwarded to assess the clarity and openness. These are whether vague responses were given or not to service users and how immediate responses and fair decisions are made.

Figure 4: Openness of Leadership in Service Delivery and Decision Making

Figure 4 shows that the respondents were asked to evaluate the management openness to the need of community in service delivery. While 86% of the respondents answered that the management and service providers respond vaguely to the questions of the customer and 14% of respondents believed the leadership provides clear responses. This indicates that the service provider is not open in service delivery and this shows a symptom of poor service delivery. The key informants also stated that there is a gap in service delivery of the town administrations. The current environment requires that institutions and processes should serve all stakeholders within a reasonable timeframe.

According to the results observed, service users were not able to evaluate the institutions management. This is even further checked by the interviews conducted with key officials as they said the institutions were not made directly evaluated by their service users.
The Provision of Timely and Quality Services
Timeliness was assessed based on how the leaders are responsive to the demand of the citizens periodically based on the duration that the customer would have waited to get service from the town administration.

Table 2: The Duration that the Customer waited to Get Responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>An hour</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>A day</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>More than two days</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>A week</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>It extends to months even years</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: field survey 2018*

Table 2 indicates that 53% of respondents did not believe to the possibility get quality services in the timeframe. It is extended to months and even more years. 23% of the respondents replied that to get a service from the town administration it took a week. About 17% of respondents believed that it took more than two days. The rest about 4% and 3% of respondents replied it took a day and an hour respectively. From this the service delivery of the town administration took a long period of time in real-life situations. Effectiveness and efficiency are one of the core elements of good governance frequently used as indicators in governance measurement.

Figure 5: Practices of Time, Human and Financial Resources Utilizations

*Source: field survey 2018*
The figure indicates that 72% of respondents believed that poor time management is the problem observed in the town administration. The rest 28% of the respondents argued that there is effective time management. Thus, the utilization of time in implementing programs and planned projects is very poor. The time aspect entails the responsiveness and speedy in which services are delivered. In this case the customer/service users couldn't receive a service in its time frame. Projects were not completed on their schedule to be ready for services. Most of key informants have opined that civil servants and leaders did not work full time. Due to this fact, community could not get timely services. As a result, community wastes its time by staying longer in municipal premises to get services. Therefore, there is poor time utilization to ensure effectiveness in Dukem town administration.

Figure 5 also illustrated that 73% of the respondents agreed that there is ineffective use of human resource. Only 27% of them said that the utilization of human resource is effective. This implies that educated manpower contributed little to the development the town. According to the data obtained from the human resource department/process those holding BA degree and above are more than 45% and most of them could not contribute more as expected from them. In some sectors, there are idle individuals who simply are paid a salary, for the improvement of the town development. Moreover, 69% of respondents justified that there is misuse of scarce financial resources. Those who replied efficient use of financial resources were only 31% of the participants. This implies that the utilization of scarce financial resources is poor. According to the finance office, more than 85% of the town budget goes to salaries which are challenging issue that affects effectiveness of the town to providing quality services.

The interviewed participants also argued that the effective utilization of resources (time, human and financial) resources had its problems. Especially most of them explained that time management is the key problem that every employee perform under expectation. Effectiveness is central to addressing societal needs and aspirations. It is argued that government institutions can only deliver inclusive services if they are effective in their approach. The resources appropriated to public institutions should be utilized to maximum in order to ensure that citizens benefit from government-led services. On the other hand, the concept of efficiency denotes that public officials use the cost in an effective manner to attain the intended outcome. In this regard, alternatives means should be pursued to ensure that maximum results are attained from available public resources.

MAJOR CHALLENGES OF URBAN GOVERNANCE IN DUKEM TOWN

Despite a fairly well growing institutional and legal framework for good governance, challenges are bound to happen. The study sought to determine some of the challenges facing Dukem in implementing good governance practices. Whereas the staff respondents applauded the government for entrenching good governance practices such as participation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness to the needs of the people and rule of law, the biggest challenge that the town faces is leadership weaknesses in the implementation of good governance package. The public sector in Ethiopia has been characterized by weak structures, inefficient services provision, corruptions, poor capacity and the routine neglect of the due process of law in matters of public issue. The specific problems facing the Dukem town administration are discussed below.
Lack of Competence and Commitment
It is clear that strategic leaders have awareness, understanding and skill in their endeavor to ensure good governance. The interviewed agreed that most of the leaders did not possess the same qualities such as determination, openness, and transparency. The interviewed respondents stated that an underlying characteristic of a leader that results in effective or better performance in a job in this regard was unsatisfactory. Most of key informants argued that poor commitment is noticeable in implementing good governance in the town administrations.

Manifestation of Rent Seeking Attitudes
According to the discussions held with key informants corruption incidences in the town had been widely perceived as a major obstacle in improving the quality of governance. Lack of transparency and secrecy that have been associated with the administrative practices of former leaderships are still practiced in terms of favoritism, nepotism. The weakness of accountability mechanisms is another impediment to improve service provisions in the town. Complex and unclear work procedures make it difficult for a citizen to get timely and quality services. The practice of maladministration has created frequent transfer of leaders and key civil servants that contributed to failure in delivery of services.

Mismatch of Existing Resources and Demand
Because of expansion of investments and industries in the town and growing urban program, there is high demand for additional infrastructure services such as (housing, pure water, feeder roads, electrification, etc.). This clearly shows that being responsive for public needs is a question of additional resources beyond planned budgets. Handling the business of economic development at municipal level requires mobilizing the necessary resources which further require institutional capability in doing so. Urban governments are expected to monitor urban development and facilitate the mobilization, distribution and allocation of resources.

CONCLUSION
Urban administration plays an important role in ensuring good governance which in turn creates stable environment to enhance social, economic and political development. Without strong and committed leadership better quality of life is unthinkable. Meanwhile leaders face different challenges in ensuring good governance in practice. The concept of good leadership is closely linked to that of vision, values and ethics. Where there is good leadership it is much easier to bring about good urban governance. A good leader will have principles of honesty and integrity and will also have vision. He or she will have respect for the citizens, know how to work with them and be able to foster innovation and new directions.

Against this backdrop, the commitment of leadership to implement urban development programs in the town was not satisfactory. This poor commitment practice of leadership can be expressed in terms of lack of sustainable tools of community participation, poor relationship between leaders and community and low involvement of CSOs, NGOs and private investors in different decision making of the town. Despite the government’s desire for good governance and institutional framework to practice good governance, the town still faces many challenges that undermine its realization of governance objectives. Corruption, low public participation, inadequate funds and low capacity hinder the full realization of good governance.
The finding indicates that poor relationships exists between leaders and community, maladministration and rent-seeking behaviors manifested in leadership practice resulted in poor consensus and trust on decisions made.

The mechanisms to disclose necessary information to the public and seeking feedbacks, comments and opinion from the public at large is poor. The leadership couldn’t fully establish a system in which government activities could be transparent. Information on rules, regulations and procedures were not timely and clearly released to the beneficiaries. Lack of transparent system and poor information disclosure produces rooms for rent seekers in service delivery. Lack of transparency and manifestation of secrecy that have been associated with the leadership practice from the past times has also led to focus on conflict of interest, nepotism and favoritism.

The weakness of accountability mechanisms is also an impediment in improving services across the institutions. The transfer of corrupted from place to place has contributed to the distrust of the community on the leadership at all levels. Firstly, there is no clear and effective mechanisms that strengthen anti-corruption endeavor and the existence of patronage network between corruption officials. Secondly, if service seekers or citizens expose wrong doers, in turn these latter revenge in the process of service provision. Thirdly, as a result of poor relationship and lack of trust on leadership, there is little attention to wrong doers to take correction measures. As it is common only political measures have been taken for a time being in which transfer of leaders from position to position took place.

There are many factors that contributed to underachievement in the utilization of time, human and financial resources. The human resource that is assumed as an engine of development implemented poorly because of inappropriate assignment. Most of the employees were not motivated to perform their duties as prescribed in working manuals. Leaders are promoted to higher positions without being sufficiently prepared for the leadership role and without sufficient understanding of the significance of good governance principles in their effort of leadership practices. In addition, lack of competence, inefficient and ineffective monitoring and evaluation system were major factors that contributed to ineffecitiveness of leadership practices of the town administration. Thus, this poor achievement is come with poor coordination with stakeholders’, manifestation of rent seeking attitudes; lack of leadership. This situation suggests that the officials of the town need to change the way they conduct government business. As indicated earlier the regional and federal governments have put in place good governance structures and principles, what is lacking is the application of good practices and effective implementation of policies by public officials.

Experience has shown that structural solutions alone cannot solve problems of urban centres. Urban governance is a process which requires political leadership which has authority, vision, and a commitment to challenges facing the town. In this context, the re-orientation, education and training among city leaders is important.

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Representation of Youth in Electoral Politics:
An Analysis of the Indian Election System

Dishant Parakh

ABSTRACT
The paper examines the role of institutions in declining participation of youth in Indian electoral politics during 16th Lok Sabha Elections held in 2014. There is an uneven proportion of young Member of Parliaments (MPs) especially belonging to dynastic succession model. Demographic indicators revealed that the median age of India as of 2018 is 27.9 years old whereas an average Indian legislature leader (Member of Parliament) is 56 years. There might be various reasons for this form of representation be it socio-economic factors combined with institutional barriers taking a path dependent trajectory, based on comparative and historical analysis. The research tries to find out leading causes to the aversion towards electoral politics by the youth which is detrimental for the vitality of democracy. It critically examines the contemporary modes of political participation spearheaded by the youth populace. The under-representation seems to emerge from decline in student led ideological movements, prevalence of political nepotism and the culture of gerontocracy in a nation of youth majority.

Keywords: Path Dependence, Youth Representation, Nepotism, Political institutions, Gerontocracy, India

INTRODUCTION
The effective functioning of democracy depends on people’s right to choose their representative, which is possible through voting by the citizens of the nation irrespective of caste, race, gender, class. Indian citizen requires Electoral Photo Identity Card (EPIC) also known as Voters ID to cast their vote during the election. They are issued by the Election Commission of India (ECI). ECI is an autonomous constitutional body overseeing proper administration during the state and central election. They have specific criteria’s for being eligible for voting based on the principle of Universal Adult Suffrage, whereby an individual must be 18 years of age (Haqqi, 1962). Additionally, a person with an unsound mind or convicted for a criminal offence is barred from voting.

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The paper concentrates towards the electoral seats bagged in by the youth Member of Parliament (MP) considered in between the age bracket of 25 to 40 years. The reason for the slab is owing to Article 84(b) of the Indian Constitution, 1949 which limits explicitly the minimum age of 25 years for contesting in the House of the People, popularly known as Lok Sabha. Majority of these youth MP contest election by receiving party ticket from any one of India’s multiple parties. Parliamentary contestation in central level attracts a diverse range of candidates in contrast to the State level and Panchayati Raj (Village level) election. At the same time, the MP is more closely allied with the party’s opinion and structure.

Besides their influence in the constituency, the subsequent status is not enhanced for an MP as much compared to Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) who is accountable for state administration. Moreover, the MP is responsible for attending meetings in Lok Sabha located in the nation’s capital, New Delhi, for almost an entire year (Forrester, 1968). Whereas, MLA travels no further than the state capital for less than a quarter season each year, making them a more active participant within the region (Forrester, 1968).

The party influence is clearly shown during the stage of candidate selection for party ticket where the procedure becomes naturally varied in Parliament and State Assembly respectively (Roy 1967). The preference can be based upon nepotism, party’s loyalty, individual’s influence, and their socio-economic assets. The senior party member has the right in vetoing the candidates. They play a crucial role in reducing the entry point for the average populace in electoral politics.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Various academic scholars have argued that lower political involvement is better off in the long run for having some democratic stability (Huntington 1968). One requires stable institutions to provide credible commitment to protect the entire ecosystem from populist pressure of elites, special interest groups and biased politics (Bardhan, 2006). It might also be owing to the understanding that individual who turn out and participate appear more informed about the current governments and their likely pick (Krishna and Morgan 2011).

Correspondingly, political institutions also need to come up with theoretical models which can point out the continuity of these declining representation under dynamic conditions (Bardhan, 2006). They must simultaneously provide a cost-benefit analysis of resisting change according to the perceptions of the elites (Bardhan, 2006). Lutz and Marsh go on to suggest that absenteeism during the voting ballot is not necessarily detrimental since non-voters and voters have similar preferences (2007). Nonetheless, under-representation leads to a loss in voicing out of the opinion of the minority group; in this case, the youth who are responsible for the nation’s future. Furthermore, in India, the outcomes in national-level elections are symptomatic to the trends of the state, which is often known as “cross effect of the ruling” (Kumar, 2013).

We do discover that a variety of subgroups have some type of guarantees, such as women, youth, individuals based on location, interests, class, race, and caste. Although the degree varies according to the party ideology (Krook et al., 2014), one can see various forms of reservation policies undertaken by the Government of India for the excluded community. These policies, when grounded with legality and coercive power of the state, then goes on to create a signal of action to be carried out in a certain way. These make most policies more durable by establishing reward and punishment for the associated activities (1990).
This policy becomes significant when the youth are becoming increasingly more disengaged, coupled with apparent apathy in politics emphasized from research (Bhavnani, 1991). Survey research done in Australia points towards young people becoming more cynical in the political process and lacking trust in politicians (Print et al. 2004). In India, specifically, the working class in the upper area remain unregistered in the voting list. The omission is mainly due to migration within the country, or without prior communication not being in their home when ECI verification is conducted (Ramanathan, 2008).

The above literature tries to identify the pattern of underrepresentation of youths in the Indian democratic system since the onset of elections. While also trying to find which institutions play a role in perpetuating this cycle. It relates directly to the status quo bias present within the political institutions creating a path-dependent institution with increasing return (Pierson 2000). The rigidities of bureaucracy make it tough to bring about revolutionary change from the path requiring critical environment for overthrowing the representation. Also, the ‘few cases, many variable’ problem given by Pierson should be kept in mind for this microcosmic study limited only for Parliamentary seats with significance given to the 16th Lok Sabha Election for examination (Pierson, 2000).

Management literature has highlighted the value of diversity in incrementing organizational development. Academicians review arguments while at the same time researching data on how managing diversity fosters competitive advantage (Cox et al. 1991). The diversity between generations in politics can create a separate cultural backdrop providing a holistic outlook during the decision-making phase in the administration, necessary for an ideal democracy.

Coupled with Rawlsian view whereby we imagine one’s self in an original position behind a veil of ignorance, not knowing anything about natural abilities or position would lead to a liberal principle of justice (Rawls 1971). Whereby, according to Rawls, there will be a rational set of representation without the presupposition of history and post dependence. Benhabib argues that this exclusion of the phenomenal realm leaves an ‘empty shell’ of self without any moral reciprocity (Benhabib, 1984). One can also question how these autonomous and subjective principles merge in contemporary society. We can take the example of the exponential rise of internet access, which has made the world enormously interconnected than ever before (Durkheim, 1984).

**METHODOLOGY**

Most of the data is gathered from the segregation of the list of MPs’ available from PRS Legislative Research, an Indian non-profit organization which was established with the mission to make the legislature more transparent among the general public. The datasets, through an interactive MP track for all the constituencies, are categorized according to the specifications such as gender, education qualification, election term, age, party, and states. A panel data of Young MP’s elected since the time of independence was adapted from an article by Anirban Banerjee who had sourced it from Centre for the Study of Developing (CSDS) data unit (2013).

**Research Data**

The results from figure 1 suggests that the youth MP elected are not gendered egalitarian in 16th Lok Sabha elections. Females account for a mere 28% among the total youth leaders for the central government. Likewise, to the case of United States, candidate system can hamper the entry for women into the public sphere, especially primary elections (Davis, 1997). This renders only, the most confident women who not surprisingly emerge to have more electoral experience and fundraising
success (Pearson and McGhee 2004). Even more so, women’s representation in the overall scenario of total 543 seats, appears bleaker with less than 12 per cent of the MP seats won by women.

Henceforth, women must perform ‘better’ than their counterparts to even fare equally in the election rally and contest (Lawless and Pearson 2008). There is pending legislation in the parliament known as Women’s Reservation Bill which proposes to amend the Constitution of India and provide 33% reservation for women in all the state assemblies and lower house of parliament. According to the amendment, there will be a rotation of the seat after each general election while having a quota-within-quota system in place for the reserved castes and Anglo-Indian (Madhavan, 2010).

The outcomes (from figure 2) advocate Meghalaya leading in state wise youth representation (excluding Lakshadweep which is a Union Territories of 1 seat), even though the state constitutes of a meagre two seats in 16th Lok Sabha’s total constituency of 543 seats. The same can be said about Himachal Pradesh and National Capital Territory of Delhi, accounting for only 4 and 7 seats correspondingly. Adjusting according to the weight of seats in the nation, even the states of Uttar Pradesh (total of 80 seats), Odisha (21) and West Bengal (42) seems to have a better youth representation compared to the national average.

The above result can give rise to separate case study analysis on its own for providing reasons for the surge of a youth leader in these state during the 2014 general election. As conversely any leader, will not want to lose their agency to the rivals, which can be these upcoming youth political leaders in their region (Moe 1990). Increasing political competitiveness will lead to a decrease in rent-seeking expenditure unless the rent is sufficiently more significant than the cost of the policymaker while the; “dissipation rate is lower than in previous research because of policymaker costs” (Godwin et al., 2006). They will, therefore, have a rent-seeking institution in the state to protect their interest and barring a new party or an individual to establish their reins.

As the problem of “political uncertainty” gives condensed attention towards long term vision, there is an attempt of political players to create barrier and arrangements that can lengthen their term (Moe 1990). The table above highlights a gradual decline in the percentage of youth MP in India since the commencement of election after independence in Lok Sabha instead of increasing the number of Youth MP since the 1952 election under PM Jawaharlal Nehru which had about 28 per cent of youth. It reveals the engagement in the political scenario after contributing to the activism movements during the independence struggle.

DECLINE IN STUDENT-LED MOVEMENT
The student movement through which various political leaders had emerged seems to have collapsed. Many organizations and interest groups which had a strong influence on the student body on the campus have faded, while the spirit of nationalism and sacrifice has deteriorated (Altbach 1966). The level of commitment and surge in protest for developments is intimately connected within the intellectual groups forming a nexus of media, academicians and student union. Political parties were influential in having a support system within these student bodies for active recruitments while also providing support to nationalist movements (Altbach, 1966).

Taking the case of Lucknow University’s student leaders for two decades after independence revealed the changing course of action for student leaders elected based on merit (Sayeed 1973). Only about 23 per cent of the student union leaders came from a politicized background in a way
contrary to their familial tradition (Sayeed 1973). After 1957, money is utilized to entertain serious professionals and lackies, leading to a leadership founded upon terror, intimidation, and violence (Sayeed, 1973).

The emphasis has also shifted from broader socio-political issues to campus-oriented or educational issues (Hazary, 1987). They are observed from the formation of the student council, which is more focused and campus-centric in their reforms and protest. A decline in ideological politics, wanting dedicated leadership and scepticism of student by the general corruption in political system and society are some of the fundamental causes of absence in student movements in education institutes around the country (Hazary, 1988).

Currently, the task of self-sufficiency towards their kin seems to be prioritized amongst the youth instead of nation-building. The centres of student unrest in India, which have received so much attention seems to be isolated demonstrations and are exceptions rather than the rule (Altbach, 1966). The student unrest in Universities in Delhi, Lucknow, Aligarh offers interesting insights but seems to be outliers when aggregated to educational institutes around the country (“Student Revolt: Inside India’s Volatile JNU Campus.”). Pilcher views that people are influenced by social and historical predominated during their youth fixed in the different subjective area due to which each generation of youth has its independent historical consciousness (1994).

Besides, the presence of young leaders need not imply compliance with the government even though there are cases of dynamic youth leaders in certain zones. Ironically, a traditionally hierarchical leader will stand in the election as they are confident of their success owing to their influence, caste, network and economic potential (Singh 1960). The same can be interpreted for elections taking place on the national level, keeping in mind the need for the party ticket in contestation. According to Stinchcombe, increasing returns rest on “historical causes” where some movement triggered a path of pattern and that activity is continuously reproduced even though the first event no longer persists (1968).

**DYNASTIC SUCCESSION – A POLITICAL NEPOTISM**

The incumbency factor reveals that elected representative already has a structural advantage in Indian elections. The incumbents have unrestricted access to state machinery and resources which they can deploy to their advantage (Okoye, Egboh and Chukwuemeka, 2012) — automatically increasing the average age of the politicians who keep getting re-elected in subsequent election term.

A research paper written on incumbency within states pointed two features leading to their winning; distal and proximate (Kumar 2013). Proximate factors such as choice of candidates, pre-poll alliance and freebies which can be equalized by even the opposition (Kumar 2013). However, the former feature, i.e. distal, such as policies and programs by the current governance during their term can provide a massive boost during the next election campaign. Thereby, the general reflection from an electorate may be to give the previous government another chance in areas that were needed to improve instead of giving a chance to novel parties and young leaders.

Furthermore, out of the 71 Youth MP’s elected in 16th Lok Sabha, almost half of the candidates (see figure 4) have been elected through nepotism within the family be it husband, uncle, father, and other close family circles. The dynastic succession whereby the political authority spans for
generations within father and son persist for the youth MP’s who are the upcoming leader by taking in the reins for the constituency. Yet, scholars argue that the “institutional fabric” required for dynastic theory is amiss in India, as the norms require the candidate to obtain support from a variety of interests during the election (Mitra 1988). They made the dynastic succession model more of an exemption than an everyday occurrence from a general perspective (Mitra 1988). In the author's opinion, nepotism of family is still widespread within the entire political eco-system.

It is accepted that parties find it expensive to build organizations and contest election as they require colossal marketing and other transaction costs (“Resilience of . . . Patronage.”, 2012). The leaders, therefore, feel that since these finances are hidden from public keeping them concentrated within the family’s control seems like the best option (“Resilience of . . . Patronage.”, 2012). This is usually the situation unless the party is driven by cadre and at the same time organized around ideology or they are tied to a civil society-based association (“Resilience of . . . Patronage.”, 2012). Obviously, it constricts the scope of youth representation in the political landscape by limiting the entry to a particular family, caste, religion, and ideology.

To overcome these issue, in the 2014 National Youth Policy (NYP) by the central government through the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports has focused on three imperatives for youth participation in governance: engagement of youth outside the political system from grassroots level to national stage, government mechanism which can leverage the youth, promoting youth in urban governance. Whereas, the Ministry of Rural Development has introduced youth connections to support fund utilization and program execution in IAP (Integrated Action Plan) districts, which are individual backward tribal districts affected by left-wing extremism via the Prime Minister Rural Development Fellowship (“National Youth Policy 2014”, 2014). Ministry of Panchayati Raj runs Rajiv Gandhi Panchayat Sashaktikaran Abhiyan to build capacities of the elected representative including and not limited to youth and first-elected representatives (“NYP 2014”, 2014)

Another scheme launched in 2007, called Panchayat Mahila Evam Yuva Shakti Abhiyan (PMEYSA) for group action empowerment for the elected youth and women representatives in village-level politics which according to guidelines disclose that about 42 per cent of the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRI's) are youth leaders. They are under the umbrella of Panchayat Yuva Shakti Abhiyan and is being initiated by collaboration with the ministry of youth affairs through its youth club named Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan. The main objective for this program is sensitization during orientation and sharing of information between the youth club members and elected representative.

According to the Ministry of Rural Development, although the expenditure under the PMEYSA scheme is minimal, it is having some impact in raising awareness among elected representatives (“Press ...Raj”, 2011). The examination of these NYP’s reveals that there is a limitation in actual engagement for youths who remain outside the political focus or are not elected. Taking on the argument forward, that if a specific segment of society has a lower political voice, the risk of policy deepening this inequality increases which can have considerable implications to the level of trust and their perceived legitimacy (Bernauer et al., 2015).

**GERONTOCRACY: YOUNG POPULATION, OLD LEADERS**

Contrastingly, India appears to be a gerontocracy system, i.e., rule by aged individuals in a country where the majority of the populace falls under the category of youth. There seems to be a cultural proclivity to seniority coupled with the fact that older adults being more likely to cast votes during
the election. One of the instances of informal gerontocracy can be viewed in Sidamo group from Ethiopia, organized in generational style patrilinear clan where the authority is held by the elders who are responsible for acquisition and protection of property disputes in return for the services provided by the young generation in the field (Hamer 1970). They even have the authority of allocation of marriage considered as the ultimate source of wealth and power, which shows the importance of gerontocratic structure in these pastoral nomads (Hamer 1970). There might also be examples where gerontocracy leads on to dynastic succession like in the case of retirement or death of the Japanese Diet (National legislature body) Member. Which then, based on the authority of name recognition, the “kōenkai” who is the local support group will search for a successor who is a blood relation to the member (Yasumi, 1990).

Also, the general notion that experience gained and network established by the veteran politicians is a significant factor leading to gerontocratic success in politics can be flawed. This agrees to the point by Frank Bruni, where attention to age can “degrade the virtue of oldster” while ruminating the inexperience of the youth (Bruni, 2019). Ironically in the case of the US Senate and House of Representatives between 1945-85, where the actual representation was lower in comparison to the expected representation of the older population (Uhlenberg 1988). Hence, there have been cases of retreat by the older generation from critical decision making in society, though this must not be implied as a corollary in India due to its diversion in norms from the western society.

However, empirical work has associated “inter-cohort change” to lower political and civic engagement and overall society’s withdrawal between the early 20th Century and Baby Bommer generation (Putnam, 2000). According to Putnam, it is a society that had experienced slow and subtle turnover of generation due to which, unlike the preceding generation, the new cohort was not as engaged in civic life (Putnam, 2000). The change arises as to the representation of the new cohort increases in demography bringing with them their unique values, making them less likely to participate in traditional electoral politics. It is difficult to reverse “inter-cohort change” since individuals generally do not adopt new tastes and thereby become a consequence of social growth (Putnam 2000).

Monetary enticements are another factor for the lower participation of youth in politics. The marketization of education and a more competitive “human capital” mentality has transformed students’ overall experience wanting them to make a career and sustain their lifestyle (Furlong et al., 1997). Giddens views tertiary education as a path that prepares for an economy that is highly specialized and fragmented (Giddens, 1991). There has been a distinction between “Student Youth” and “Non-Student Youth” noted by sociologist Y. B Damle. Student youth have the pressure for career and attainment of prestigious jobs, making them resistant to an ideology which requires understanding with action (Damle, 1989). While on the other hand, Non-student youth are preoccupied with making a living because of which ideology-based political action is not viable (Damle, 1989). This united with the circumstance that political entry requires huge influence or, under the table, bribery to obtain party ticket, both of which practiced among the older public who now have the time and monetary power to join electoral politics.

CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Political mobility within the constituency can influence the participation of youth in national parties. Taking a case study of Seva Bharati Projects, which are volunteering projects by Youth RSS members
in Chennai and Bangalore, paints a different picture (Chidambaram 2012). Youth attrition in Chennai for volunteering on a long-term basis becomes curtailed as there are better opportunities for employment and mobility through linkages of regional political parties compared to Bangalore (Chidambaram 2012). There is a relation for future political participation through the involvement of groups in community service, public forums oration, and generating a communal identity than other forms of voluntary association (McFarland & Thomas, 2006).

Emerging technologies like social media connections through the internet or even wireless handheld devices are branded as “Web 2.0”, in various ways, they also induce participation in democracy (Chadwick 2009). Alternative modes of political activism leading to engagement seen in various parts of the world are challenging youth apathy notions in politics. The event of Occupy Movement had been to a nuanced combination of technology and participatory democracy by the youth during their protest (Milne 2011). Scholars note that involvement with social movements, coordinated by the overarching organization, provides exposure to the individual with a chain of activists that facilitate long term engagement and retention (Fisher, 2012).

In this digital era, youth have become more proactive in sharing their views and opinion while at the same time, political parties have started using these platforms to connect with the youth. Nathan Manning suggests that while the collectivist and organized form of traditional politics has declined, new political practices are emerging around an individual’s everyday life, which exploits contemporary social conditions to bring comprehensive socio-political change (Manning 2012). We see that youth have been forth runners of democracy whenever such organized awareness and activism are carried out in the grassroots. Thus, digital rebellion due to its lower transaction cost of impending change against the policy of the government with lower repercussion can act as an informal substitute path over the cumbersome journey of joining a party they resonate with, among the youth.

Consequently, Web 2.0 is significantly used to increase one’s popularity, affiliate with admired groups, and maintain good relations, there are only small minorities who identify themselves as political activist representing a small subcategory in social media (Miller, 2016). The factory owners in China who use their indigenous social network WeChat choose not to post anything political to avoid themselves in a potentially dire stance with the local government (Miller, 2016). The Indian government is also underway on projects like NETRA tracking all the content on the web for suspicious activity (Xynou and Elonnai, 2016). The advent of big data technology with an identity-based tracking system such as Aadhar Card and other documents can provide intimate profiling of individuals without their consent.

In other electoral countries such as Chile, low turnout has become class based as the system of Voluntary registration is combined with compulsory voting (Corvalan and Cox, 2013). The aim was to restrict participation and popular will as they introduced two institutions that constrain them: registration rule and electoral system, which favored right-wing politics (Corvalan and Cox, 2013). The ratio of voting age population seems to be declining at a constant rate of 1.3 percent per year, leading to 24 percentage cumulative in the past two decades with wealthy citizens voting much higher than the deprived counterparts (Corvalan and Cox, 2013). The system was also built to favour right-wing party which condensed the outcomes and drastically changed government elections.
CROSS COUNTRY ANALYSIS

Even in India, urban residents, primarily educated middle and upper class, complained that the enrolment process is a critical barrier in participation during voting ballots as they need to demonstrate proof of residence at election centers during a set time and date (Gowda, 2010). In the case of Chile, there is an institutional barrier likewise to India for the upper class and youth who may regularly migrate for work or study purposes domestically. Indian data reveals that active participation is more among the poor, thereby highlighting the weak social bias in favor of the privileged class (Kumar, 2009).

In a cross-country report of four Anglo-Saxon nations of the USA, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, there seems to be a proliferation of “Progressive Individualist” values among the youth. As they experience their lifestyle in an individualistic and disjointed structure, it compromises their collective action in social and political issues, making them less probable to engage in electoral politics. Adding on to the setting is dynastic succession based on analysis from different Asian countries, which cements non-democratic rule in North Korea and Singapore, sustain political domination in electoral democracies i.e., Japan and India or built-up mass opposition and revolt in Burma and Bangladesh (Mark, 2012).

One of the major reasons for the pertinence of low youth representation is the profitability for the elites to implement these steps, as they find the original stance in politics to further their economic for domination and rent-seeking (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). Paradoxically, a more significant democratic advantage, consecutively leads to greater domination in politics by the elites as they invest more in their de facto power to avoid costs in the future (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). The Polya urn process, where the element of chance combined with a decision rule that links outcomes of preceding events by Mathematician Arthur can also be demonstrated in politics (Arthur, 1994).

The four features accompanying path dependence or increasing return process, given by Pierson are:

- **Multiple Equilibria** – Several outcomes are possible based on conditions being conducive to growing returns, such as dynastic models and other socio-economic factors leading to underrepresentation of youth.
- **Contingency** – Relatively small events such as the decline in merit-based student union leaders occurring in right-wing movement, leading to enduring and wide consequences.
- **A critical role of timing and sequencing** – Earlier events of continued dynastic models and low youth engagement post-independence making it more important than the latter circumstance. Therefore, later events might not matter due to institutional barriers put in place.
- **Inertia** – Once the path has established, positive feedback may lead to a single equilibrium. This makes the institution change resistant.

These paths of development are “interdependent web of an institutional matrix,” which produces an increasing return in the future (North 1990). All these above features are espoused in the institution of youth representation in electoral politics, making the entire model in a political path dependence unless significant juncture, which might act as “exogenous shock,” puts an overall pressure on the existing path (Mahoney, 2000).
CONCLUSION
As argued by Mahoney and Thelen, when institutions lack the power to change the rules, the player in this case the youth should deploy layering strategies to attach new regulations to the existing one which can bring about a substantial change in the logic and reproduction of the core institution (Mahoney and Thelen, 2012). There was a shift in the political science community during the 1990s towards institutional and ideational analysis (Zhang, 2011). Intuitional approach aids in understanding how institutions construct the politics and how it evolves over a period while the ideational approach reconnoitres the significance of ideas, which can be a casual belief in the framework of policymaking and the political result (Zhang, 2011).

The idea of seniority as merit altogether in Indian societal norms can be one of the reasons for outcomes towards older representatives and might require separate research entirely. Combining the idea, with the logic of “collective action,” where individuals tend to free ride contributed to the under-representation of youth as a path-dependent institution (Osln, 1965).

Therefore, charting a sustainable condition for collective action and a broad change in the democratic discourse and practice is required to change the path of youth under-representation in India. We are not living in an age-irrelevant society, yet as more demographical conditions lead the working class in the economy, we need to critically examine the needs of the youth, by the youth, for the youth – by growing their inputs in decision making bodies especially in electoral politics.

REFERENCES


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http://www.livemint.com/2008/05/22003058/Fuzzy-electoral-math.html


Figure 1: Author’s Calculation, PRS MP Track
Figure 2: Author’s calculation, PRS MP Track

Statewise Percentage (%) Representation of MP's below 40 (16th Lok Sabha Election)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karnataka</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerala</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCT Delhi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lakshwadeep</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajasthan</td>
<td>12.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meghalaya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Himachal Pradesh</td>
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<td>Haryana</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihar</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assam</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chhattisgarh</td>
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</tr>
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<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil Nadu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Odisha</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madhya Pradesh</td>
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<td>Maharashtra</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bengal</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
<td>18.8</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3: Author’s Calculation, Adapted from Banerjee - CSDS Data

Figure 4: Author’s Calculation, PRS MP Track

Number of MP's below 40 (16th Lok Sabha)

36
35

Family Nepotism
No family influence
Table 1: No. of MP's below 40 based on Gender (16th Lok Sabha Elections) (Author’s Calculation, PRS MP Track)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>No. of MP's below 40</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>20</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 State wise no. of MP's below 40 (16th Lok Sabha Elections) (Author’s calculation, PRS MP Track)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Total Number of Seats</th>
<th>Percentage of Young MP's (Below 40 years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>18.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Bengal</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>21.4</td>
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<td>Maharashtra</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>14.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madhya Pradesh</td>
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<td>10.3</td>
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<td>Odisha</td>
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<td>23.8</td>
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<td>7.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Andhra Pradesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCT Delhi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kerala</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karnataka</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Time series data of Young MP’s in Indian Lok Sabha Elections (Author’s Calculation, Adapted from Banerjee 2013 - CSDS Data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number Of MP’s below 40</th>
<th>Total Seats</th>
<th>% of Total Seats for the election term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>28.6</td>
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<td>1957</td>
<td>164</td>
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<td>1962</td>
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<td>112</td>
<td>541</td>
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<td>93</td>
<td>545</td>
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<tr>
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<td>11.2</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>71</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>543</td>
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Table 4: Number of MP’s below 40 based on dynastic succession (16th Lok Sabha) (Author’s Calculation, PRS MP Track)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family connection in politics</th>
<th>36</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No family influence</td>
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Augmenting Ease of Living in India: 
A Critique of Union Budget 2020-21

Srirang K Jha* and Manoj Kumar**

ABSTRACT
This article provides a razor-sharp analysis of the union budget 2020-21. Indeed, the union budget of India for the fiscal year 2020-21 is path-breaking in many ways. More than complicated fiscal issues, it focuses on promoting ease of living and social sector reforms without losing the sight on fiscal prudence and steady economic growth. The budget offers a slew of short-term, medium-term and long-term measures aimed at augmenting ease of living and bringing Indian economy back on the track. This budget has given due consideration to the farm sector, potable water, solar energy, healthcare, infrastructure, education, railways and above all, social security. Nevertheless, the government has consistently failed to implement the welfare schemes adequately and often underspent the funds in the past years. As a result, poverty remains a nation-wide problem without any holistic solution. It will be worthwhile to watch how the benefits of union budget unfold and touch the lives of all the stakeholders in a meaningful manner under the current dispensation.

Keywords: Ease of Living, Union Budget, FY 2020-21, India

INTRODUCTION
Union Budget of India for the fiscal year 2020-21 is path-breaking in many ways. More than complicated fiscal issues, it focuses on promoting ease of living and social sector reforms without losing the sight on fiscal prudence and steady economic growth. The budget offers a slew of short-term, medium-term and long-term measures aimed at augmenting ease of living and bringing Indian economy back on the track. This budget has given due consideration to the farm sector, potable water, solar energy, healthcare, infrastructure, education, railways and above all, social security.

There are four building blocks of Union budget 2020-21:
- Seamless delivery of services through Digital Governance;
- Improvement in physical quality of life through the National Infrastructure Pipeline;
- Risk mitigation through Disaster Resilience;

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• Social security through Pension and Insurance penetration$^1$.

Further, the union budget 2020-21 is imbued with three prominent leitmotifs which are likely to revitalize the economy of the country and give an appropriate fillip to ease of living:

• Aspirational India in which all sections of the society seek better standards of living, with access to health, education and better jobs;

• Economic development for all, indicated in the Prime Minister’s exhortation of ‘Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas, Sabka Vishwas’;

• Caring Society that is both humane and compassionate, where Antyodaya is an article of faith$^2$.

True to the spirit of augmenting ease of living and strengthening the economy of the country, the union budget provides for agriculture credit to the tune of INR 15 lakh crore coupled with ambitious schemes such as Kisan Rail and Krishi Udaan to put a national cold supply chain facility in place. It is undoubtedly going to prove a game-changer in the overturning the proverbial distress in the farm sector. Another initiative to empower the farmers financially is PM-KUSUM by enabling them to set up 20 lakh standalone solar pumps. The government is committed to spending about INR 2.83 lakh crore on agriculture, rural development, irrigation, etc. so that the income of the farmers can be doubled in a couple of years. Besides, the government is also serious about promoting fishery through Sagar Mitra scheme and Fish Farmer Producer Organisations. No less is the commitment of the government to promote dairy, horticulture and animal husbandry. If all the schemes aimed at expanding the livelihood opportunities in rural India and increasing income levels of the farmers are appropriately implemented, the results would be phenomenal in terms of prosperity at the bottom of the pyramid in Indian social milieu.

Infrastructure development is crucial for revitalizing the economy of the country. The government of India has committed to spending INR 100 Lakh Crore over the next five years. Thrust areas for infrastructure development include pipelines, national gas grid, highways, expressways, economic corridors, coastal and land port roads, railway electrification, redevelopment of railway stations, development of new airports, development of power renewal energy sector, etc. Infusion of considerable investments in infrastructure development is most likely to usher economic growth coupled with employment generation. Infrastructure development will not only infuse a fresh lease of life in the economy but also contribute profusely towards augmenting ease of living. Defining focus on infrastructure development in the union budget 2020-21 is likely to push India towards the road to the prosperity of the citizens, communities, entrepreneurs and the corporate world.

Due importance has been accorded to health and wellness in the union budget 2020-21 to foster ease of living and ensure economic development. The budget provides for the liberal allocation of INR 69000 crore to boost PM Jan Arogya Yojana (PMJAY) to help the poor in tier 2 and tier 3 cities during morbidity at 20000 empanelled hospitals. The union budget also looks at setting up hospitals under Public Private Partnership mode in aspirational districts, using machine learning and artificial intelligence as part of the Ayushman Bharat scheme$^3$. Expansion of Jan Aushadhi Kendras in all the districts of the country is yet another ambitious plan of the government as reflected in the union budget 2020-21. If all the programs envisaged in the union budget 2020-21 are adequately implemented, the country will surge ahead in pursuits of wealth with healthy communities of people.
Focus on sanitation, and potable water in the union budget 2020-21 in many ways support the condescending goal of the government to ensure health and wellness to all the citizens. The government has made a fresh commitment of INR 12300 crore in the union budget 2020-21 to strengthen further and expand Swachh Bharat Mission which is 28% more than the allocation made during the last fiscal year\(^4\). This fund is likely to be used to reinforce Open Defecation Free (ODF) behaviour which resulted from the construction of toilets in the households of the low-income families across the country. ODF behaviour has reduced the incidence of morbidity among the poor in the country to a great extent. Lack of potable water has been a significant pain point in thousands of villages, and people often get sick after using contaminated water. The government has unfolded Jal Jeevan Mission —a determined programme to provide potable piped water to every household with an over-the-top allocation of 11,500 crores.

The government has shown its commitment towards building an empowered inclusive society by allocating INR 85000 crore towards the welfare of the Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Classes and INR 53,700 crore for the Scheduled Tribes in the union budget 2020-21. Hence, the people who live on the margins of the society may expect a windfall from the current allocation of funds for their welfare. Moreover, the government has also allocated INR 28600 crore for women’s development and INR 35600 crore for programs aimed at augmenting nutrition among the poor communities. These programmes are also likely to enhance ease of living, especially for those who are cursed to live in abject poverty at the bottom of the pyramid.

Critique

While the government has unfolded several ambitious plans to reduce the perennial stress in the farm sector, there is no long term remedy of the farm sector woes which have turned worse in the recent times in the wake of an enormous economic slowdown. Farm sector needs reforms aimed at the long term and sustained improvement in the livelihoods and income levels of the farmers and landless peasants and not the quick fixes which may appear quite appealing but fizzle out in no time\(^5\). It is true that the government often makes lofty announcements concerning allocation on social benefit programmes in order to create a larger than life humane image but fails miserably when it comes to spending the money. For example, the government underspent ₹75,532 crores on budgeted food subsidy\(^6\). At a time when consumption expenditure data and reports by newspapers, including this one, have documented the decline in food expenditure, cutting down food subsidy to the poor in two consecutive years is not just bad for rural demand, but for nutritional outcomes too —more so at a time when food inflation is close to 14%\(^7\).

The union budget may appear pro-poor and well-aligned to the pressing needs of the farmers. However, in reality, farmers may continue to live at the receiving end. In fact, the government failed in terms of spending allocated funds on irrigation, food security, agriculture, fertilizer subsidies, etc. has adversely affected poverty eradication move of the state. Furthermore, this is a recurrent issue. Even the state governments often fail to spend the money allocated by the centre to them for implementing centrally-funded welfare schemes. It only perpetuates the vicious cycle of poverty despite the right intentions of the government.

Further, the government has proposed INR 8689 crore cut in fertilizer subsidy in the union budget 2020-21, which is also likely to raise the input costs of the farmers and put them in a precarious situation. At a time when the farm sector is in a crisis, the cutback in spending and reduction in fertilizer subsidy may only aggravate the agrarian distress\(^8\). The budget not only fails to live up to its
rhetoric of India realizing its growth potential and but it also fails to live up to the promise of providing *sab ka saath, sab ka vikas*, with the burden of adjustment falling on the poor and the farmers.

**Conclusion**

The union budget 2020-21 has resolutely focused on improving the ease and quality of life for all, with the underlying objective of achieving a consumption-led growth, especially the 16-point action plan and the ₹2.83 trillion outlays focused on agriculture, and allied activities are likely to bolster rural infrastructure, increase farmers’ produce realisation and drive rural consumption. Further, the announcements and initiatives for increasing rural income, skill enhancement across sectors, MSMEs/start-ups growth, job creation and infrastructure development, should increase disposable income, thereby boosting consumption, as well as the economy. Further, it is reasonably clear now that investment in sanitation is a facilitator for broader economic, health and social gains. It is laudable that the government has continued its commitment to *Swachch Bharat* Mission in terms of allocation of funds.

The union budget indeed has a clear focus on augmenting ease of living for people of all segments in the society. However, the real challenge is the implementation of the schemes for social welfare, healthcare, infrastructure development, industrial development, agriculture and rural development. Every year the government makes significant allocations for social welfare, but actual spending is alarmingly low. As a result, the poor remain entangled in the vicious cycle of poverty. The then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi gave the first call for eradicating poverty (Garibi Hatao) in 1970. Even after 50 years, the focus of the government remains eradication of poverty. In the last fifty years, there have been scores of social welfare schemes aimed at helping the people living below the poverty line. However, the issue remains unresolved. The most plausible reason appears to implementation failure and underutilization of allocated resources. It is high time that the government ensures proper utilization of allocated resources and implementation of the state-sponsored schemes on the ground in order to augment ease of living in the country.

**ENDNOTES**

2. ibid.
3. ibid.
7. ibid.
8. ibid.
9. ibid.